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Abstract 
The first chapter studies the labour supply decision of couples in the context of Pareto 
efficient models. The analysis is carried out by means of the reservation wage theory. In the 
unitary model, we find that for each spouse there exists a unique combination of reservation 
wages that allows to derive the participation frontier. Within the collective model, on the 
other hand, price dependent utility functions means that a unique reservation wage need 
no longer exist and, in turn, the participation frontier cannot be drawn. However, we show 
that if the bargaining power index is independent of current market wages the completeness 
of the reservation wage theory is re-established. 
The second chapter examines the production-consumption household collective model 
under the assumptions of complete and absent markets for the domestic good. We find the 
conditions of market's structures or household technology that ensure separability between 
production and consumption-leisure decisions. We perform a qualitative analysis to the 
household models developed under different market structures. 
The last chapter presents a finite-horizon dynamic model of fertility and consumption 
within a certain environment. Fertility is modelled as a discrete choice and it is the 
outcome of comparisons between parents' welfare level with and without an extra child. 
The fertility model emphasizes the effects exerted on the family size decision by the costs 
of rearing children. We show that in each period of the reproductive life the couple does 
not have a child if the pure utility gain from not having a child is greater than the utility 
saving in cost from having the child. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Motivation for Individual Approaches to Family Be-
haviour 
Since Becker's seminal work, family behaviour has been described by means of a welfare 
index representing preferences of the family as a whole. Within this approach, referred to 
as unitary, the family is considered as the elementary decision unit and it is characterized 
by a unique utility function that is maximized subject to a family budget constraint. 
The popularity of the unitary approach is grounded on a number of theoretical and 
empirical respects. For instance, the integrability properties of the unitary approach allow 
economists to recover household preferences from the observation of market consumption 
and in turn it is a necessary condition for normative analysis such as welfare compari-
son across households or optimal taxation. Besides, the economic properties satisfied by 
optimal demands derived by the unitary set-up, in particular the symmetry of Slutsky 
substitution matrix, enable simplifications in empirical estimation. Moreover, household 
micro data are in general collected at the household level, hence the representation of 
the family as though it were a unique maximizing agent seems to accustom better the 
household expenditure surveys. 
Despite these attractive properties, it has been widely recognized that the unitary 
model is not appropriate both to represent theoretical and empirical individual behaviour 
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and to answer important questions of normative analysis. In particular, from a theoretical 
point of view, the unitary approach conflicts with the neoclassical economic theory in 
which every agent should be represented by her own preferences. On the other hand, from 
a welfare viewpoint, it implies that household resources are equally divided between family 
members. However, it is debatable if household resources are equally shared between 
individuals and it may be that neglecting intra-household inequality leads to misleading 
measurement of inequality and poverty (Haddad and Kanbur 1990). 
Empirical works have rejected a number of the properties underlying the unitary set-
ting. In the traditional household model it is assumed that income is pooled and then 
allocated to maximize the household welfare. The income pooling property implies that 
household outcomes are not affected by who in the family has control on the resources. 
Besides, the pooling hypothesis has important policy implications. In particular, it has 
consequences on policy programs in which the target is a specific class of individuals within 
the household, such as children and women. Results of empirical works suggest that ex-
penditure household data are not consistent with the pooled income hypothesis. Using 
data from Thailand, Schultz (1990) examines the impact of nonlabour income on fertility 
rates discovering that more nonlabour income in the women hands tends to raise fertility. 
Using a Brazilian survey on family health and nutrition, Thomas (1990) attempts to infer 
how resources are allocated within the family members by focusing on particular house-
hold outcomes, such as nutrient intake, child health, survival, and fertility. He finds that 
nonlabour income under the wives' control has a bigger effect on family health than in-
come controlled by husbands and the assumption of common preferences of unitary model 
is rejected. Finally, he shows evidence for gender preferences, mothers prefer to devote 
resources to improving the welfare status of daughters, fathers to sons. Moreover, there 
exists evidence that neglecting the rule in which families share resources across members 
can produce misleading welfare analyses (Haddad and Kanbur 1990, Bargain et al. 2006). 
A further implication of utility theory is the symmetry of the matrix of substitution 
terms. However, Slutsky restrictions are often rejected by empirical studies (Blundell, 
Pashardes, and Weber 1993, Browning and Chiappori 1998). Three main explanations 
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can justify the rejection of Slutsky symmetry. First, the rejection may be a consequence 
of a mispecification of functional forms applied in estimating demand systems. Second, 
the rejection may depend on the fact that there does not exist a utility function which is 
compatible with the data. The last plausible interpretation is that families do not behave 
as though they were a unique agent and therefore should be accepted that the neoclassical 
economic theory is not the conventional approach to represent the behaviour of a group 
of agents. 
Given the discussed theoretical and empirical weaknesses of the unitary approach, in 
the 1980s viable strands, alternative to the traditional setting, have thus been developed. 
However, before reviewing the alternative models of family behaviour, with the following 
brilliant insights by Seccombe (1995:146-150) we desire to emphasize the relevance, under 
many respects, of looking inside the family black box. 
"In the period from 1813 to 1914, working-class families came to depend on the primary 
breadwinner's income to a greater degree than ever before. Studies of family budgets com-
piled around the turn of the century consistently place the househead's contribution (where 
he is present and regularly employed) at 10 to 80 per cent of the total family income. This 
dependency varied over the family cycle and between strata of the proletariat; the higher 
a man's pay, the greater was his family's reliance upon him. Yet it seems that among all 
layers of the working class, the male breadwinner's income assumed greater importance in 
this period. The reasons for this trend are not difficult to discern: a very considerable rise 
in men's real wages; the curtailment of child labour; and reduced opportunities for women 
to make money at home. 
A deepening reliance on the working man's income meant that the family's fortunes 
hinged critically upon the division of his wage between his own personal spending money 
and the housekeeping budget, handled by his wife. [. .. ) 
The connection between Saturday-night drunkenness and the mode of wage payment 
became an issue in the temperance battles of the period. In Scotland, the temperance 
movement won a major victory in 1853 when pubs were forced to close at eleven o'clock. 
Per capita alcohol consumption declined from then on, and a great many women must have 
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blessed the Saturday closing hour as they set off to market with a greater share of their 
husbands' pay. [ ... ) 
Because the distribution of wages within the family is an informal matter that has 
not been adequately studied, it is impossible to gauge with any precision the prevalence 
of different patterns of wage allocation. By my reckoning, three broad variants may be 
distinguished. A significant minority of men came straight home with their pay, handed 
it over in its entirety to their wives and took back a modest amount for personal needs at 
their spouses' discretion or by mutual agreement. From women's standpoint, the whole-
wage system {as this variant has been called) was exemplary. Men who adhered to it 
were universally praised as considerate and kind husbands 'who treat marriage as a real 
partnership, who regard "my wages" as "our wages," and who plan out the expenditure of 
joint income with their wives'. 
Far more common, however, and probably the dominant pattern, was for working men 
to hand over a housekeeping allowance, generally a fixed sum keeping whatever was left 
over for themselves. [ ... ) Men were tempted to keep spouses in the dark as to how much 
they made in bonuses and overtime so that they could spend these extras' as they wished. 
In her 1910 study of Middlesbrough, Lady Bell found that a third of ironworkers' wives 
did not know how much their husbands made. 
The fixed allowance had the advantage of being a stable arrangement which provides 
wives with a predictable income to make ends meet. The essence of the provisioning ex-
ercise was to adapt the family's collective needs to the size of the allowance. But when 
the allowance barely covered the regular weekly expenses of food and rent, it was almost 
impossible to set aside funds for children's boots, new clothes or unexpected medical bills. 
Hlhen extraordinary expenses arose, women had to ask their husbands for additional funds; 
special purchases thus took the form of gifts' from Papa. The alternative was to stint on 
other items; typically, housewives spent less on food, going short themselves to make up 
the difference. [. .. ) 
In a third variant, extremely pernicious but not uncommon, the cash wives obtained 
was an unpredictable and variable residual-the amount left over after their husbands had 
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visited the pub or betting shop. ( ... } Working men who drank' their pay' caused their 
wives no end of grief. It was impossible to maintain an orderly household under a random 
income schedule. They needed no prompting from middle-class feminists and temperance 
crusaders to denounce such men as callous husbands. [ ... } 
The allocation of the breadwinner's wage was of such importance to women that the 
criterion of whether a man is a "good husband" [is} the proportion of his wages which he 
gives to his wife. ' Watching their mothers cope, girls developed a strong sense of a fair 
division. ( ... } 
In Sismondi 's view, the modern working man has become accustomed to the fact that 
he never knows a future beyond next Saturday when he is paid. [ ... } He has too often been 
led to think about present comforts so as not to be too afraid of the future suffering his 
wife and children may bear. Arthur Young preferred the truck system for the same reason: 
'An Irishman loves his whiskey as an Englishman does strong beer; but he cannot go to 
the whiskey house on Saturday night and drink out the support of himself, his wife and 
his children, not uncommon in the alehouses of England, ' As the wage increasingly took 
the form of a payment to individuals, its subsequent redistribution became a private affair 
between spouses, widely considered to be no one else's business but their own'. This ethic 
made it more difficult for women to combat its abuse. " 
Recently, economists have recognized the importance of considering the family as a col-
lection of individuals rather than as if it were a unique decision unit and, in addition, they 
have recognized the relevance of inferring how family members share household resources 
among them. These family models are referred to as collective models. The collective 
approach to the household can be divided into two broad categories: family approaches 
that rely on cooperative solutions to bargaining among individuals and family approaches 
that rely on noncooperative models. 
There are two types of cooperative approaches. Models in which it is supposed only 
that family outcomes are always Pareto efficient (Apps and Rees 1988, 1996, 1997, Brown-
ing and Chiappori 1998, Chiappori 1988, 1992, 1997) and nothing is assumed a priori about 
the nature of the decision process, or equivalently, about the location of the final outcome 
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on the household Pareto frontier. And family cooperative models in which the decision 
process is explicitly determined using bargaining theory. 
The collective model proposed by Chiappori adopts a theoretical framework in which 
each household member is characterized by her own preferences and, assuming that the 
decision process results in Pareto efficient outcomes, he shows that when agents are "egois-
tic" and consumption is purely private, the collective model generates testable restrictions 
and, from observed market behaviour, one can recover certain structural elements of the 
decision process, such as individual preferences and the rule that determines the alloca-
tion of resources within the family. The decision-making process underlying the collective 
model can be modelled as if decisions occur in two stages. First, household members agree 
on the allocation of nonlabour income between them and then each agent independently 
decides the allocation of her own money resources among different goods. 
In bargaining cooperative models (Manser and Brown 1980, McElroy and Horney 1981) 
households are supposed to be composed of two agents. Preferences of each household 
member are represented by a well-behaved utility function and each member is endowed 
with a given level of utility, that represents the pay-off if agreement within the family is 
not reached. The individual utility function, therefore, depends on a threat point and, in 
turn, the Nash bargaining solutions are functions not only of prices and income but also of 
the threat point. This dependence is the critical empirical implication of the cooperative 
bargaining models. 
In contrast to cooperative models, the noncooperative approach does not assume that 
members necessarily enter into binding and enforceable agreements with each other. They 
assume that individuals within the household have differing preferences and they act as 
autonomous individuals. The noncooperative models consider a two-person household in 
which each individual controls her own income and purchases commodities, subject to an 
individual nonpooled income constraint. A net transfer of income between individuals 
establishes the only link between family members. Each individual has a utility function 
of goods she exclusively consumes and a good consumed in common but not public, condi-
tional on the level of net transfers. When making decisions, each person takes net transfers 
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as given and chooses the goods she will exclusively consume in order to maximize her own 
utility subject to her individual budget constraint. This family framework yields individ-
ual demand functions which depend on prices and net transfers. The Nash equilibrium 
is the level of goods consumed by both individuals that satisfies both demand function 
simultaneously. A feature of the noncooperative models is that family outcomes need not 
be Pareto efficient. However, efficiency may be obtained as a result of independent decision 
making. 
In the remainder of the introduction we describe the general assumptions underlying 
the collective model and then summarize the organization and major findings of the thesis. 
In the thesis family behaviour is represented using the unitary and the collective models. 
1.2 General Assumptions of the Collective Model 
In general, the collective model of household behaviour considers a family with two decision 
makers, the wife f and the husband m, who consume for their private use the vector of 
goods x E ~N that is composed of ordinary, assignable and exclusive goods.1 A good 
is ordinary when it is a private good is consumed in unobserved proportions by all or 
some non identifiable household members. This is the common case given the information 
traditionally available in household expenditure survey. A good is assignable when a 
strictly private good and is consumed in observed proportions by each member of the 
household. This may be the case when it is possible to assign the consumption of clothing 
either to the adult or children component of the household. Finally, a good is exclusive 
when a strictly private good is consumed by one identifiable member of the household 
only. An assignable or exclusive good that is frequently considered in literature is leisure. 
In the thesis, the assignable good is the individual demand for leisure Li and the 
individual consumption of a composite market good ci represents the ordinary good. Here, 
we assume that all time not spent at paid work is leisure time. Individual time is thus 
equal toT= Li+zi where zi is i's labour supply. The family then faces a budget constraint 
1Throughout the thesis superscripts denote endogenours variables, while subscripts index either exoge-
nous variables or, in the case of functions, the derivatives of the endogenous variables. 
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that limits the private consumption of market goods and leisure of the two spouses. The 
budget constraint takes the usual linear market form~~! PiCi = ~~! wili + y, ·where Pi 
are market prices of the composite goods, Wi are market wages andy is family nonlabour 
income. Finally, throughout the thesis we ignore both the consumption of public goods 
and externalities within the family. 
The collective household model relies on three assumptions. 
Assumption 1.1 Individual preferences are assumed to be represented by an egoistic 
strictly quasi-concave utility function, continuously differentiable and strictly increasing 
in its elements 
It is important to underline that "egoistic" preferences are not necessary to recover 
the individual behaviour and the collective set-up can be extended to a caring utility 
function ui = fji [U f ( cf, Lf), um (em, Lm) J without altering the conclusions of the model 
(Chiappori 1992). 
Assumption 1.2 Household decisions are assumed to result in Pareto-efficient outcomes. 
This assumption does not necessarily imply "harmony" between spouses, thus a col-
lective model may also describe families experiencing marriage dissolution. The rationale 
motivation of the Pareto efficient assumption is that efficient allocations are likely to 
emerge from repeated interactions in stationary environments and households are an ex-
ample of such an environment. However, there can be situations in which the efficient 
assumption may fail to apply. An example can be when existing social norms impose 
some patterns of behaviour that deviate from efficient outcomes (Udry 1996). Inefficient 
outcomes are also plausible for decisions that are not taken frequently, for instance fertility 
and education choices (Lundberg and Pollak 2003), which imply that the repeated game 
argument cannot be applied. 
Assumption 1.3 The decision process J.Li is a function continuously differentiable in its 
arguments of variables that enter the budget constraint, such as market prices, wages and 
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nonlabour income. 
The Pareto weight f-Li captures the balance of power in the family and determines the 
final allocation on the Pareto frontier. If f-Li = 1 then the household behaves as though 
member i is the effective household dictator, whereas 1-Li = 0 it is the opposite scenario. 
For intermediate values of f-Li, the household behaves as though each spouse has some 
decision power. In general, in labour supply models the distribution index 1-Li is made to 
depend on wages and nonlabour income. The value of 1-Li may also depend on variables 
that influence the balance of power without affecting both the value of individual utility 
functions and the household opportunity set. In literature these variables are referred to 
as distribution factors. 
The household behaviour can be described by the maximization of the following weighted 
household utility function wh 
subject to the household budget constraint 
m 
PJCJ + PmCm + WjLf + WmLm = 2..: WiT+ y, 
i=f 
from which the individual demands for leisure and composite market goods are derived 
with Jii = 1-Li (PJ,Pm, Wj, Wm, y) fori= j, m. It is worth remarking that the unitary model 
is a special case of the collective model. This is the case when the weight Jii does not 
depend on prices and nonlabour income. 
The behavioural implications of the collective model require extending the integrabil-
ity property of standard consumer theory to the following generalization of the Slutsky 
condition. The generalized Slutsky equation of the collective model has the following form 
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(Browning and Chiappori 1998) 
where the first term between brackets is the conventional Slutsky equation of the unitary 
model. The corresponding Slutsky matrix is 
S = ~ + R = ~ + D JL · v' 
h [ aLi ·aLi J aLi w ere the matrix~ summarizes awi + V ay , the vector DJL is of general term afji and 
the vector vis [ ~~; +I)~ J. 
Equation Sij represents the Slutsky equation performed for a market demand function 
derived from a collective framework. As shown by Browning and Chiappori (1998), in 
the collective model the substitution matrix fails to satisfy the symmetry property. In 
particular, the Slutsky matrix must be equal to the sum of a symmetric semi-definite 
matrix and a rank-one matrix S = ~ + R. Note that is the conventional symmetric 
matrix derived holding the Pareto weight constant. The interpretation of this result is 
the following. For any given pair of utility functions, a) the household budget constraint 
determines the Pareto frontier as a function of prices and income, and b) the value of 
the Pareto weight Ji determines the location of the household equilibrium on the frontier. 
Consequently, a change in prices implies a shift of the Pareto frontier. The shift of the 
Pareto frontier entails the modification of household demands described by the symmetric 
matrix~. However, the value of Ji varies as well, since it is a function of prices and income. 
Hence the location of the equilibrium moves along the Pareto frontier. This movement is 
represented by R. 
1.3 Organization and Major Findings of the Thesis 
The thesis analyses the family behaviour in the context of Pareto efficient models. In par-
ticular, the thesis deals with family labour participation decisions, household production 
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undertaken by the family and fertility choices. The first two chapters are developed within 
a static framework, on the other hand, the analysis of family fertility choices is carried out 
within a dynamic framework. 
Family Labour Participation Decisions within Pareto Efficient Household Models 
The purpose of the first chapter is to describe the labour participation decisions of a two-
person family in a given period of time. A family member decides to participate in the 
labour market if her reservation wage, the value she places on her marginal units of time 
in leisure and consumption, is equal to the market wage she can earn in the labour market 
(Heckman 197 4). The analysis of individual labour participation decisions is pursued using 
both the unitary and collective approach to represent the household behaviour. We assume 
that household preferences have the functional form of a Bergson welfare index defined 
by the weighted aggregation of individual utility levels. In the unitary model weights are 
constant and, on the other hand, in the collective model they are functions of variables 
entering the budget constraint. 
In particular, the chapter attempts to give a theoretical characterization to the indi-
vidual reservation wage function and the participation (nonparticipation) frontier derived 
within the unitary and collective models. The analysis abstracts from rigidity of male 
labour supply, involuntary unemployment and household production. 
The structure and results of the chapter are as follows. 
• Within the unitary model the reservation wage function of each spouse is uniquely 
identified. In consequence, the participation frontier, defined by the set of prices, 
wages and nonlabour income bundles for which a household member is indifferent 
between working or not working, can be identified. The participation frontier divides 
the market wage plane in four regions. Each region is characterized by an opportunity 
set such that the spouses are jointly better off either of them working, neither of them 
working, or one working and the other not. 
• In addition, the chapter presents testable restrictions that the individual demands 
of leisure (labour) belonging to the four labour participation regimes must satisfy 
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in order to be compatible with the structure of household preferences described by 
the unitary model. In particular, the income pooling hypothesis and conventional 
Slutsky conditions, negativity and symmetry, must be satisfied by the individual 
demands for leisure. 
• Furthermore, the chapter preforms a qualitative analysis on the individual reserva-
tion wage function. In each labour participation regime, we study the effect on the 
reservation wage function of marginal increases in the market wage of the spouse 
that works. In order to provide this qualitative analysis we apply Blundell et al. 
(2007) to our framework in which both spouses decide whether to participate or 
not. We find that the effect on the reservation wage function of marginal increases 
in the market wage of the spouse that works can be decomposed into two effects: 
an income effect and the difference in labour supply curves of the working spouse 
derived in the labour participation regimes in which both spouses work and in which 
only a spouse works. The latter effect is divided by the labour supply of the other 
spouse. This result is similar to that obtained by Blundell et al. (2007) with the 
only difference that in Blundell et al. (2007) the second term is not divided by 
the labour supply of the other spouse. This difference originates from the fact that 
Blundell et al. (2007) study the labour participation decisions of one spouse only. 
Here, our contribution is that we apply this result to characterize the participation 
frontier. In particular, assuming that the income effect is always positive we define 
the conditions under which the participation frontier is positively /negatively affected 
by marginal increases of the wage of the working spouse. 
• On the other hand, within the collective model the presence of current market wages 
in household preferences means that a unique reservation wage need no longer exist. 
As a consequence, the participation frontier may not be identified unless further 
assumptions are made. This negative result is consistent with previous findings 
(Blundell et al. 2007, Donni 2003). To overcome this drawback, Blundell et al. 
(2007) and Donni (2003) postulate that the reservation wage is a contraction map-
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ping with respect to market wages ensuring in this way the existence of a unique 
reservation wage in each participation regime and therefore the existence of a fixed 
point in the plan of wages from which the participation frontier starts. 
• Unlike Blundell et al. (2007) and Donni (2003), in order to uniquely derive the indi-
vidual reservation wage function in each labour participation regime and to identify 
the participation frontier, in the chapter we assume that the agent's bargaining 
power, among other variables, is a function of individual expected wages, defined 
as a function of past working experience, demographic characteristics of the agent 
and macro-economics indicators. In this way, the Pareto weight does not depend 
on current market wages. Given this assumption, the reservation wage theory leads 
to a complete characterization of the labour participation decision also within the 
collective model of household behavior. 
Separability and Joint Production in the Collective Household Model 
The second chapter presents the collective approach to the household behaviour with 
production and consumption-leisure decisions. The household is seen as jointly engaged 
in production and consumption-leisure decisions. Within this setting the household is 
involved in producing domestic goods by transforming input factors. At the same time, 
the household chooses the optimal consumption of market-purchased goods, leisure, and 
domestic goods produced by the family. Thus the production and consumption-leisure 
decision processes must be integrated into one single problem. 
Economists have devoted substantial attention to the separation property of production 
and consumption-leisure decisions. In the context of the unitary model, a number of works 
have studies the separation property both from a theoretical and an empirical point of view 
(Benjamin 1992, Bardhan and Udry 1999, Chayanov 1986, Lopez 1984, Sen 1966, Singh, 
Squire, and Strauss 1986). In the context of the collective model, Chiappori (1997) points 
to the separation property between production and consumption-leisure decisions but then 
his analysis is confined to show that the decision process is identifiable also taking into 
account production activities of the family. In this research area, however, there are still 
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some questions that need to be addressed and clarified especially within the collecth·e 
model. 
In the context of a general equilibrium model, Lofgren and Robinson (1999:663) state 
that "Household production and consumption decisions are nonseparable whenever the 
household shadow price of at least one production-consumption good is not given exoge-
nously by the market but instead is determined endogenously by the interaction between 
household demand and supply." However, as we clarify later on, in the case of missing 
markets for goods produced by families separability of production and consumption de-
cisions may hold true. In particular, production functions with constant returns to scale 
are a sufficient condition for the separability property to hold. This sufficient condition is 
general in the sense that it applies to cooperative household models and noncooperative 
household models as well. Moreover, in the case of missing markets a behavioural aspect 
that needs to be clarified is that when making production decisions families have a cost 
minimizing behaviour. We emphasize this point since a number of works (Apps and Rees 
1997, Chiappori 1997, Rapoport, Sofer, and Solaz 2003) model the family as maximizing 
profit on the basis of implicit prices of the domestic good. 
In general, most of the collective models with household production assume that fam-
ilies produce a generic output privately consumed in unobservable proportions by their 
members (Apps and Rees 1997, Chiappori 1997, Donni 2005, Rapoport, Sofer, and So-
laz 2003). Differently, we examine the case in which with the same input variables and 
technology the family produces two different domestic goods privately consumed by its 
members. In this way, we can study the effects of joint production technologies on the 
structure of the collective household model. 
Furthermore, we perform a comparative statics analysis on individual demands for 
leisure and domestic good derived from the collective model developed under different 
market structures. Thus, the generalized Slutsky equation derived by Browning and 
Chiappori (1998) is extended to collective models with marketable and nonmarketable 
domestic goods. 
The following points describe in detail the content of the chapter. 
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• For reasons of completeness, the chapter starts by describing the case of marketable 
domestic goods. When markets are complete, the family produces an aggregated out-
put that can be sold at a given market price or privately consumed by each household 
member. The price of the domestic good is determined on the marketplace and the 
separation property between production and consumption-leisure choices holds. As 
a consequence, the household decides the optimal production plan independently of 
its optimal consumption-leisure bundle. Conversely, the consumption-leisure choices 
are affected by the production activities of the family through profit effects. 
• The chapter then turns to study the case in which markets for the domestic good 
are incomplete or absent. Moreover, household production is modelled by means of 
joint technologies: with the same variable inputs and technology the family produces 
two different outputs privately consumed by each member. When markets for the 
domestic goods are missing, the implicit price of the domestic good is endogenous to 
each household and it is jointly determined by the household's choices. Under the 
circumstance of absent markets, we find that constant returns to scale are sufficient 
to ensure that the implicit domestic price does not depend on household tastes and 
the decision process. This result ensures the separability between production and 
consumption-leisure choices. In the first stage the family decides the optimal time 
devoted to the production activities, then it decides the individual consumption of 
market goods, leisure and domestic goods. It is worth remarking that with missing 
markets in taking production decisions the family has a cost minimizing behaviour. 
• Then, the chapter introduces the case of missing markets for the domestic good 
with nonconstant returns to scale maintaining the assumption of joint production 
functions. It is shown that the implicit price of the domestic good depends on 
the production-consumption variables and, therefore, the household model must 
be solved jointly with consumption-leisure decisions. In general, within collectiYe 
models nonseparability of production and consumption-leisure choices has negative 
consequences also for the household model structure. In particular, the consumption-
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leisure choices cannot be modelled as if it were a two-stage budgeting process mean-
ing that the sharing rule approach cannot be employed. This finding has crucial 
consequence for empirical applications. As pointed out by Browning, Chiappori. 
and Lewbel (2006) identification of the Pareto weight requires knowledge of the un-
observable cardinalization of member utilities. Therefore to provide identification 
of the structural model one needs to know those cardinalizations and the results 
may strongly depend on the cardinalization chosen by researchers. In addition, in 
accord with previous findings (Pollak and Watcher 1975), due to joint technologies 
a closed-form solution to the production-consumption household model cannot be 
found. 
• In order to provide closed-form solutions and to implement the sharing rule ap-
proach, in chapter two alternative specifications of the production function are pro-
posed, though it is recognized that they may model very specific household produc-
tions. In both alternatives jointness in production is omitted. However, in both 
alternatives production decisions must be solved jointly with consumption-leisure 
decisions. A first alternative assumes that domestic goods are produced using two 
distinct production functions in which both household members allocate a part of 
their time. Without joint technologies the production-consumption household model 
has a closed-form solution. However, it cannot be extended to the sharing rule ap-
proach. In the second alternative each household member produces by herself the 
domestic good that she consumes. The advantage of the latter is that, given an ap-
propriate exogenous sharing rule, the household program can be decentralized into 
two individual programs in which each member chooses production and consump-
tion variables jointly, but independently of production-consumption decisions of the 
other member. 
A Dynamic Model of Consumption and Discrete Fertility Choice 
The last chapter presents a finite-horizon dynamic model of fertility and consumption 
within a certain environment. Fertility is modelled as a discrete choice and it is the 
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outcome of comparisons between parents' welfare level with and without an extra child. 
The dynamic model of discrete fertility choice emphasizes the effects exerted on the 
family size decision by the costs of rearing children. The theoretical model is developed 
under a set of simplifying assumptions designed to obtain an analytical solution to the 
household dynamic program. In particular, we assume that household utility is of the 
CARA form and, neglecting that spouses can have different fertility preferences, we ab-
stract from bargaining processes that can occur within the couple. Furthermore, we assume 
that parents face perfectly foreseen costs of rearing a child and these costs are equal across 
children. 
The dynamic household model of fertility choice developed in the chapter is similar 
to that of Wolpin (1984). Studying the connection between child mortality and fertility 
within a dynamic stochastic model, Wolpin (1984) treats the fertility choice as a discrete 
endogenous variable. However, Wolpin (1984) aims at estimating the dynamic fertility 
model and he does not develop an analytical representation of the optimal fertility choice 
rule. 
Within this framework, we show that: 
• Given CARA preferences, optimal consumption depends positively and linearly on 
current disposable resources net of the costs of rearing children. Another feature of 
optimal consumption derived by CARA preferences is that it may be negative. In 
our model the probability of negative consumption increases since household wealth 
available for consumption is reduced by the costs of rearing children. During the 
reproductive life, in each period of time the couple's decision of having a child leads 
to a discrete shift in the intercept of optimal consumption and it increases the to-
tal costs of rearing children faced by the family. Therefore, it is likely that optimal 
consumption will fall due to the extra costs related to the presence of a new child. 
As the number of dependent children increases, ceteris paribus, there are less re-
sources available for family consumption other than expenditures for children and 
consumption decreases. 
• In each period of the reproductive life the couple does not have a child if the pure 
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utility gain from not having a child is greater than the utility saving in cost from 
having the child. In each period of the reproductive life the choice "whether to 
have an additional child or not" is based upon the costs of rearing children faced 
by the couple. Fertility choices are also influenced by the coefficient of absolute 
risk aversion. In particular, as the costs of rearing children increase it is likely that 
the new birth does not occur. Similarly, if the coefficient of absolute risk aversion 
increases. The interest rate indirectly affects the fertility choice: an increase in the 
interest rate positively affects the costs of having an additional child reducing, m 
this way, the probability that a new birth occurs. 
• The chapter presents a simulation exercise of the dynamic model. The fertility 
outcome is analysed for traditional and non-traditional couples. The former is a 
family in which there is only one main wage earner. On the other hand, the non-
traditional family is characterized by the presence of two wage earners. In this way, 
we control for different fertility outcomes due to different costs of rearing children 
faced by the two families. As expected, the traditional couple decides to have more 
children relative to the non-traditional couple. In particular, the traditional family 
has two children with a two year gap between the first and second birth. On the other 
hand, the non-traditional couple has just one child. The consumption pattern and 
assets accumulation of the two families are influenced by different fertility outcomes. 
Given a bigger family size, throughout the reproductive life consumption pattern 
of the traditional family is in general higher relative to consumption of the non-
traditional family. To sustain family consumption, through the reproductive life 
both families have negative assets accumulation. To study how the interest rate 
may influence parents' fertility choices we also run the simulation assuming that the 
interest rate is equal to zero. As the interest rate decreases, all the other things 
being equal, the costs of having a child decreases as well increasing, in this way, the 
probability of a new birth. With the interest rate equal to zero both traditional and 
non-traditional families have one more child with respect to the previous scenario. 
Moreover, setting the interest rate equal to zero has the effect of reducing the spacing 
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of births. Patterns of the simulated consumption and assets accumulation for the 
two families are similar to those obtained with a positive interest rate. 
Chapter 2 
Family Labour Participation 
w-ithin Pareto Efficient Models 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate and characterize the labour participation 
decisions of a two-person family in a given period of time. This purpose is pursued using 
both a traditional and a collective approach to represent the household behaviour. A 
family member decides to participate in the labour force if her reservation wage, the 
value she places on her marginal units of time in leisure and consumption, is equal to 
the market wage she can earn in the labour market (Heckman 1974). We assume that 
household preferences have the functional form of a Bergson welfare index defined by the 
weighted aggregation of individual utility levels where in the unitary model weights are 
constant and, on the other hand, in the collective model they are functions of variables 
entering the budget constraint. 
Traditionally, the household has been considered as if it were an elementary decision 
unit maximizing a unique welfare index subject to a family budget constraint. Underlying 
the unitary model there is the assumption that the family combines all sources of income 
into a unique income measure. As a consequence of the income pooling hypothesis, family 
outcomes are not affected by who has control over money and, in turn, resources are 
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equally allocated among family members. Implicit in the unitary model there is the 
concept either that the topic of intra-household resource allocation is irrelevant or that it 
can be addressed within the fiction of a dictatorial decision-making process. 
However, even though most of its testable properties have been rejected by micro data 
(Schultz 1990, Thomas 1990, Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales 1997, Fortin and Lacroix 1997, 
Browning and Chiappori 1998) and the evidence that neglecting the rule in which families 
share resources across members can produce misleading welfare analyses (Haddad and 
Kanbur 1990, Bargain et al. 2006), the unitary model has been extensively applied both 
to represent many aspects of the household behaviour and to carry out welfare analyses. 
In a labour economics perspective, there exists a vast literature that employs the unitary 
model. This literature covers a wide range of economic and social aspects, such as the 
analysis of causal relationships between female labour supply and fertility choices. 
Recently, other economic models have been developed to study the household be-
haviour. In contrast to the unitary model, these models are focused on the behaviour of 
individuals. Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981) represent family 
decisions within a Nash bargaining framework. However, the collective model proposed 
by Chiappori gets more considerable attention from economists. Chiappori (1988, 1992) 
adopts an alternative theoretical framework in which each household member is charac-
terized by her own preferences and, assuming that the decision process results in Pareto 
efficient outcomes, he shows that when agents are "egoistic" and consumption is purely 
private, the collective model generates testable restrictions and, from observed market 
behaviour, one can recover certain structural elements of the decision process, such as 
individual preferences and the rule that determines the allocation of resources within the 
family. The decision-making process underlying the collective model can be modelled as 
if decisions occur in two stages. First, household members agree on the allocation of non-
labour income between them and then each agent independently decides the allocation of 
her own money resources among different goods. 
In the context of a collective framework, Blundell et al. (2007) build a household 
model of labour participation based on two empirical features of the U.K. labour market. 
•)•) 
In particular, Blundell et al. (2007) notice that a large proportion of married women 
do not work at all and the husband's working hours do not present much variation. In 
general, men work full-time or do not work. This labour market feature produces empirical 
difficulties when researchers attempt to infer the individual decision process by observing 
male's labour supply. Therefore, Blundell et al. (2007) model husband's working hours as 
a discrete choice and wife's working hours as a continuous variable censored from below. 
In doing so, they show that the sharing rule is recovered up to an additive constant 
and individual preferences are identified. Donni (2003) completes the analysis of labour 
participation undertaken in Blundell et al. (2007) treating the husband's labour choice as 
a continuous variable. 
Using French data, Donni (2006) generalizes this line of research assuming that the 
individual labour participation is not the result of a free choice and extends the theory 
of household behaviour under rationing (Neary and Roberts 1980) to collective models. 
However, the aim of these articles is confined to show that the sharing rule and the 
underlying individual preferences are identifiable, and to derive testable restrictions in 
collective frameworks that account for corner solutions. 
The present chapter focuses on a different aspect of the analysis of family labour par-
ticipation. In particular, we attempt to give a theoretical characterization to reservation 
wages and the participation (nonparticipation) frontier derived within the unitary and 
collective models. The analysis abstracts from rigidity of male labour supply, involuntary 
unemployment and household production. 
Within the unitary model we find that the reservation wage of each spouse is uniquely 
identified. In consequence, the participation frontier is represented in the locus of spouses' 
market wages and it divides the market wage plane in four regions. Each region is char-
acterized by an opportunity set such that the spouses are jointly better off either of them 
working, neither of them working, or one working and the other not. 
On the other hand, within the collective model the presence of current market wages in 
household preferences, or equivalently in the sharing rule, means that a unique reservation 
wage need no longer exist. As a consequence, the participation frontier is not well-behaved 
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unless further assumptions are made. To overcome this drawback, Blundell et al. (2007) 
and Donni (2003) postulate that the reservation wage is a contraction mapping with 
respect to market wages ensuring in this way the existence of a unique reservation wage in 
each participation regime and therefore the existence of a fixed point in the plan of wages 
from which starts the participation frontier. 
Differently, in labour collective models with corner solutions we assume that agent's 
bargaining power, among other variables, is a function of individual expected wages, de-
fined as function of past working experience, demographic characteristics of the agent and 
macro-economics indicators. In this way, we neglect that the Pareto weight depends on 
current market wages of spouses. Given this assumption we find that the reservation wage 
theory leads to a complete characterization of the labour participation decision also within 
the collective model of household behavior. 
The chapter is laid out as follows. In Section 2.2 we address the labour participation 
decisions in the context of the unitary model. In Section 2.3 we characterize the labour 
supply equations and reservation wages derived by the traditional model of household 
behaviour. In Sections 2.4 and subsequent, we extend the collective labour supply model 
(Chiappori 1988, 1992) to corner solutions. The conclusions end the chapter. 
2.2 Family Labour Participation within the Unitary Model 
We start by investigating the labour participation in the context of the unitary model. The 
family, composed by two persons f and m, possesses a Bergson welfare function Wh with 
preferences of each spouse represented by a continuously differentiable, and strictly quasi-
concave utility function Ui defined over the consumption of a private composite market 
good ci and leisure Li. We assume that all time not spent at paid work is leisure time. 
Individual time endowment is normalized to one and leisure is thus equal to Li = 1 - zi. 
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The family solves the following constrained program 
(2.1) 
and cf > 0, em > 0, 0 < z! < 1, 0 < zm < 1, 
where J.L is a scalar, Pi is the market price of the private composite market good ci, wi is 
the individual market wage1 and y is the household nonlabour income. 
Maximization of program (2.1) with respect to the variables of choice yields the fol-
lowing Kuhn-Tucker first-order necessary conditions 
J.LiU~i - 8pi < 0, with equality if ci > 0, i = f, m, (2.2) 
-J.LiU/i + 8wi < 0, with equality if zi > 0, i = J, m, (2.3) 
(2.4) 
where 8 is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the budget constraint and hereafter 
subscripted functions indicate derivatives. In equations (2.2)-(2.3) the constant weight for 
i = f is equal to J.lj = J.L and for i = m becomes J.Lm = 1 - J.L. Note that in the collective 
model the weight J.L is a function of exogenous variables that determines the location of 
the family on the Pareto efficient frontier. 
In our analysis, individual consumption of the composite market good is assumed to be 
positive everywhere, therefore, equation (2.2) holds as a strict equality for any combination 
of market prices, wages and nonlabour income. On the other hand, the labour behaviour 
of spouses is represented by the following necessary equilibrium conditions. 
Both Spouses Participate, p: {Zf > 0, zm > O,pfcf + PmCm = Wjlf + Wmlm + y} 
1 We assume that wages are constant. Therefore, we ignore the fact that the marginal wage of each 
agent may depend on the amount of her working hours. From an empirical point of view, this assumption 
rules out the endogeneity's issue of wage rates. 
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We begin with the analysis of the interior solution. P denotes the wage plane in which both 
household members participate in the labour market. Spouses find it optimal to jointly 
participate in the labour force if and only if at interior values of leisure the individual 
marginal rate of substitution between working hours and consumption of the composite 
market good is equal to the ratio of market wage to market price 
ul~ ( cf' 1 - z!) - w f 
uf1 (cf, 1- Zf) PJ 
from which we can derive the optimal labour supply equations 
zm p 
Pm 
(2.5) 
(2.6) 
and the individual demands for leisure are £~ = 1 - ~ for i = j, m. When both spouses 
work the optimal level of household welfare is WP(pJ,Pm, Wj, Wm, y). 
Given the assumption of additive separability between individual consumption-labour 
choices of the household utility function Wh, i's marginal rate of substitution is indepen-
dent of consumption and leisure decisions of j meaning that the labour participation and 
private consumption of the husband and wife are not jointly determined. In principle, 
the assumption of additive separability imposes significant restrictions on the structure of 
the household model. However, empirical evidence rejects the hypothesis that the labour 
supply of the spouses is jointly determined (Lundberg 1988). Thus, the assumption of ad-
ditive separability between individual consumption-labour choices does not impose strong 
restrictions on the structure of model (2.1). 
Setting the individual labour equation T~ equal to zero we find the reservation wage of 
member i by solving for Wi 2 
*i i ( ) £ . _j_ • f Wp. = Wp. PJ,Pm, Wj, y , or 'l -r- J = , m. 
J J 
2 Equivalently, the reservation wage can be derived equalizing the marginal rate of substitution between 
labour and consumption to the ratio of the corresponding prices and solving for Wi. 
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This equation represents the marginal value of time at which i is indifferent between 
working or not working when the other spouse finds it optimal to supply a positive amount 
of working hours. 
In the following example we clarify how the reservation wage theory works within the 
unitary model described in (2.1). 
Example 2.1 Let us suppose that each individual has preferences of Cobb-Douglas form 
where ai and f3i are parameters. TVhen both spouses work, the household opportunity set 
is equal to 
The first-order conditions for an interior solution are 
where b is the Lagrange multiplier. Substituting the set of first-order equations into the 
budget constraint we obtain the expression for the reciprocal of b 
1 Wj +wm +y 
"J - ~i=f,m J-li ( Qi + f3i) . 
Replacing the expression of 1/ b in the first order conditions we get the optimal solution 
for the individual demands of the composite market good and labour supply 
J-liQi Wj + Wm + Y 
P, ~i=f,m J-li ( Qi + /3i)' 
1 _ J-lif3i W f + Wm + Y 
Wi ~i=f,m J-li ( Qi + f3i) 
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Now, to find i's reservation wage we set i's optimal labour supply equal to zero 
p = 1 - J.-Ld3i W f + Wm + y = 0 
Wi Li=J,m J.-li (ai + f3i) 
and, then, we solve this equation for Wi 
getting i 's reservation wage when j is working. Note that if J.-li = 1/ j3i then the denominator 
of the reservation wage function goes to zero and the reservation wage is not defined. 
Wife Does Not Participate and Husband Participates, PM: {lf = 0, lm > 0, 
PJCJ + PmCm = Wmlm + y} 
The labour regime in which the wife chooses not to work and the husband to work, denoted 
by PM, will be optimal if and only if 
Pm 
where f's marginal rate of substitution is valued at interior solutions for private consump-
tion cf > 0 and at zero working hours z! = 0. On the other hand, m's marginal rate 
of substitution is valuated at interior solutions both for private consumption em > 0 and 
labour supply lm > 0. 
In particular, the husband finds it optimal to supply the following positive number of 
working hours 
l"Jt = l''fJM (PJ,Pm,Wm,Y), 
and the individual demands for leisure are L[JM = 1 - TrpM and L~M = 1. In this participa-
tion regime, at the optimum the family gets a welfare level equal to w~M(PJ,Pm, Wm, y). 
Solving the labour equation zrpM with respect to Wm we have the expression for the 
husband reservation wage 
(2.7) 
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and, since the wife does not work, the reservation wage function w'Nm depends only on 
market prices and household nonlabour income. 
Example 2.2 Continuing with the previous example, when the wife does not work the 
household budget constraint becomes 
and the first-order conditions are 
J-liai 
8 , fori= f, m, 
W _ 1-Lmf3m m 8 . 
Similarly, the expression for 1/8 is 
1 Wm+Y 
8 'L-i=J,m 1-Li (ai + f3i)' 
and substituting 1/8 into the first-order conditions we get the optimal solution of the in-
dividual demands for the composite market good and husband's labour supply 
J-liai Wm + Y 
-- , fori=f,m, 
Pi J-ljaf + 1-Lm (am+ f3m) 
zm 1 _ J-Lmf3m Wm + Y 
Wm J-ljaf + 1-Lm (am+ f3m). 
Now, to find the male reservation wage we set the optimal labour supply equal to zero that 
is lm = 0 and solve for Wm 
that gives the husband reservation wage when his wife finds it optimal to supply zero 
working hours. 
Wife Participates and Husband Does Not Participate, PF: {lf > 0, lm = 0, 
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PJCf + PmCm = Wjlf + y} 
Similarly, the labour regime in which the wife works and the husband does not work. 
denoted by Pp, will be optimal if and only if 
uf (cf 1 -lf) 
lf ' 
U f1 ( cf, 1 - Zf) 
Wf 
Pt 
U{.:;, (em, 1) Wm 
and > U:Jn (em, 1) Pm' 
where f's marginal rate of substitution is valued at interior solutions for individual con-
sumption of the composite good cf > 0 and labour supply lf > 0, and m's marginal rate 
of substitution is valued at interior solutions for individual consumption of the composite 
good em > 0 and at corner solutions for labour supply lm = 0. 
The wife finds it optimal to supply the following positive number of working hours 
with individual leisure demands equal to L~F = 1-T~F and LIJF = 1. In this participation 
regime, the optimal level of household welfare is w~F (p f' Pm, w f' y). 
Solving the labour equation T~F with respect to w f we have the expression for the wife 
reservation wage when the husband does not work 
(2.8) 
As in equation (2. 7), the reservation wage w;J is function of market prices and household 
nonlabour income only. 
Example 2.3 To complete the analysis, when the husband does not work the household 
budget constraint becomes 
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and the first-order conditions are 
fori= f,m, 
The expression for 1/5 is 
1 Wj +y 
5 ~i=f,m J.li ( Qi + (3i)' 
from which we get the optimal solution of the demand for market goods and wife's labour 
supply 
J.liQi Wj + y 
( ) 
, fori= f, m, 
Pi J.Lm Qm + J.L f Q f + f3 f 
z! 1- J.ljf3f Wj + y 
W f J.Lm Qm + J.L f ( Q f + f3 f) ' 
with 
that gives the wife reservation wage when the husband does not work. 
Both Spouses Do Not Participate, N: {lf = 0, lm = O,pfef + Pmem = y} 
Finally, the couple decides to not take part in the labour market if and only if 
U[:;, (em, 1) Wm 
and > -, U~ (em, 1) Pm 
spouses' marginal rates of substitution, valued at interior solutions of private consumption 
and at zero working hour, are greater than the ratio of market wage over the price of market 
goods. In this case, spouses allocate all time to leisure, thus L~ = 1, L"JJ = 1. The optimal 
welfare level of the family is WR;- (p f, Pm, y). 
In this section we have shown that within the unitary framework with linear budget 
constraint the reservation wage theory is a valid technique to study a two-person family 
labour decision. We now turn to characterize the unitary model of household labour 
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participation outlined in this section. 
2.3 Characterization of the Unitary Model 
In this section we derive testable restrictions that the optimal solutions belonging to the 
four labour participation regimes N, Pp, PM, P must satisfy in order to be compatible with 
the structure of household preferences described in (2.1). The characterization of model 
(2.1) is focused on the individual demand for leisure. 
A property that must be satisfied by any economic set-up modelling rational behaviour 
is that the leisure demand Li ( ·) must be homogeneous of degree zero in prices, wages, and 
nonlabour income. Then, in each labour participation regime, the individual demand for 
leisure must satisfy the following conditions. 
2.3.1 Income Pooling Hypothesis and the Slutsky Equation for Unitary 
Leisure Demands 
Both Spouses Work 
Income Pooling Hypothesis 
Standard implications of the unitary model are that a) individual members pool their 
incomes and, further, b) the identity of the income recipient does not matter on household 
outcomes. As a consequence, when both spouses work, the income pooling hypothesis 
imposes the following restriction 
L~j = L~, both spouses work, (2.9) 
fori =f j = J, m. The income pooling hypothesis underlying the unitary model thus implies 
that family income will affect household behaviour and moreover the identity of the income 
recipient does not matter on household outcomes. 
The Slutsky Equation 
L t L~i Li ( y) be i's leisure demand curve when both spouses work. e p = p PJ,Pm,Wf,Wm, 
32 
The effect of a marginal variation of Wj on L~ compensated by a change in y such that 
the family utility is kept constant, that is 
{)Li {)Li {)Li 
{) P dwj = 0 P dwj + 0 P dy, i, j = f, m, Wj Wj y 
is equal to 
(2.10) 
which is the conventional Slutsky equation. 3 If leisure is a normal good, then the income 
effect 
8~Yk is positive, and as y increases consumption of leisure increases. The term in 
brackets ( 1- L~) , representing the labour supply of member j, is positive. Now, for 
i = j the own-wage effect ~~7 is negative and hence the overall effect (2.10) is negative. 
On the other hand, for i =/= j the sign of ~~k is ambiguous and depends on the fact that 
J 
i 's labour supply is a complement or a substitute for j 's labour supply and, without more 
assumptions, we cannot sign cross-wage effects (2.10). 
When both spouses work, compensated wage effects can be summarized in a symmetric 
and negative semi-definite substitution matrix 
[ 
Sii Sij ] Sp= 
Sji Sjj 
both spouses work, 
where Sij L~j - zj Lt for i, j = J, m is the compensated wage effect, negativity of 
own-wage effects means that Sii, Sjj < 0, symmetry of compensated cross-wage effect 
3 The Slutsky equation can be derived as follows (see for instance Silberberg 1990). Let us define the 
expenditure function y = y*(PJ,Pm,Wf,Wm,W0 ) as the minimum income level that keeps the household 
welfare W constant to a given level W 0 when Wj changes. In our setting the expenditure function is 
Y = ~ ._1 PiCi- ~ ._1 Wi (1- Li). By definition Ut- ,m Wt- ,m 
L*i (PJ,Pm,Wj,Wm,W0 ) = Li (PhPm,Wf,Wm,Y*(pJ,Pm,Wj,Wm,W0 )), 
where the left-hand side is the compensated demand of i's leisure. Differentiate then both sides of the 
identity with respect to Wj 
aL *i aLi aLi ay* 
--=--+---, 
awj awj ay awj 
where by the envelope theorem ~!*. = - (1- Lj) and we derive the Slutsky equation 
J 
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means Bij = Bji and negativity of the determinant of the substitution matrix Sp implies 
SiiSjj - STj < 0. 
Only Spouse i Works 
When only member i participates in the labour force, the unitary model implies that 
L~. = 0, j does not work, 
J (2.11) 
when member j does not take part in the labour force, changes of j market wage do 
not affect the leisure demand of the other spouse. In general, in the collective model 
restriction (2.11) may not hold true. If the Pareto weight J.L is assumed to depend, among 
other variables, on j's market wage, even if j does not work, then marginal changes of j's 
market wage affect the labour supply of i through changes in the Pareto weight J.L. 
The Slutsky Equation 
On the other hand, when only member i works i's demand for leisure is L~1 = L~1 (pf,Pm, wi, y) 
and the compensated own-wage effect is equal to 
aL~I -- f)L~I - (1 - Li ) f)L~i p only i works. 
awi awi i ay ' 
Under the assumption of normality, the compensated own-wage effect is negative: as long 
as leisure becomes more expensive a rational individual decreases her own consumption of 
leisure. 
2.3.2 Characterization of the Participation Frontier 
We study the effects of marginal changes of spouses' market wage on the participation 
frontier. The participation frontier is defined by the set of prices, wages and nonlabour 
income bundles for which a household member is indifferent between working or not work-
ing. The analysis is a generalization of Blundell et al. (2007) to the case in which both 
spouses decide whether to participate or not.4 
4 In the context of a unitary model in which the labour participation of spouses is jointly determined, 
Simmons (2006) provides a similar characterization to the participation frontier. 
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Only Spouse j Works 
The participation decision of member i depends on the difference between the house-
hold welfare when i does not work and the other spouse does, W~)Pi,Pj, Wj, y), and the 
household welfare when both spouses work, W~(Pi,Pj, wi, Wj, y). Therefore, if 
then member i does not work and zi = 0, otherwise i works and zi > 0. 
The participation frontier is thus characterized by the following equality 
(2.12) 
where w~J = w~J (Pi,Pj,Wj,y) is i's reservation wage when the other spouse supplies a 
positive number of working hours. According to equation (2.12), the reservation wage 
function w~J is such that the household optimal utility functions in the two participation 
regimes, W~ and W~J, are equal meaning that the family enjoys the same level of welfare 
regardless of spouses' working status. 
To derive the effect of j's wage variations on i's reservation wage function, we totally 
differentiate relation (2.12), keeping market prices Pi and Pj constant, 
Using Roy's identity we have 
(2.14) 
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where 
aw~ 1aw~ lp, both spouses work, (2.15) ow*t oy PJ 
awh awh 
PJ I PJ ~J' only j works, (2.16) awj ay 
are Roy's identities derived in two labour participation regimes from which we obtain the 
labour equation of member i when both spouses work (2.15), and member j when only j 
works (2.16). 
Substituting equations (2.15) and (2.16) into (2.14), we obtain 
(2.17) 
Differentiating the household opportunity set in PJ we find the value of dy 
Replacing it into equation (2.17) and re-arranging terms we have 
(2.18) 
dividing by l~ both sides of equation (2.18), we obtain the effect of a change of j's market 
wage on i's reservation wage wip 
J 
(2.19) 
Equation (2.19) is similar to the analysis performed by Blundell et al. (2007). The effect 
of a marginal variation of j's market wage on i's reservation wage can be decomposed 
~· owi 
into two effects: an income effect l~J a:.r and the difference between j's labour supply 
curves in the two labour participation regimes ~J - l~. Unlike the analysis of Blundell 
et al. (2007), here the latter effect is divided by i's labour supply curve. This difference 
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originates from the fact that Blundell et al. (2007) study the labour participation decision 
of one spouse only. 
To provide interpretations to equation (2.19) that allow to characterize the participa-
tion frontier the following assumption is in order. 
Assumption 2.1 We assume that the income effect (Jr::v~Jjay is positive. 
Assumption 2.1 states that as the nonlabour income increases, ceteris paribus, i 's 
reservation wage increases as well. In turn, as i's reservation wage increases member i will 
participate in the labour market for relative higher market wages reducing, in this way, 
the probability that i will work. 
The following situations then can occur. 
Proposition 2.1 Given Assumption 2.1, a positive variation of j's market wage increases 
i 's reservation wage function w~J if and only if one of the following relationships holds 
i) either the difference between j's labour supply curves in the two participation regimes 
~J - l~ is positive, 
ii) or the difference betweenj's labour supply curves in the two participation regimes T~J -~ 
is negative but the income effect is stronger than j 's difference in labour supplies, thus 
J -j i lp -lp J OWp 
.l < l __.::..J_ zi PJ ay · p 
The implication of Proposition 2.1 on the participation frontier is as follows. 
Proposition 2.2 If i 's reservation wage function w~J increases as Wj increases, then the 
participation frontier, dividing the wage loci in which both spouses work P and only j works 
PJ, is upwards sloping. 
In order to ease interpretation of Proposition 2.2 suppose that member j is the husband 
and member i the wife. Then Proposition 2.2 states that as husband's market wage 
raises the wife participates in the labour market for relative high market wages. From 
an empirical perspective, the result of Proposition 2.2 is plausible especially within the 
unitary model in which the identity of the income recipient does not matter on household 
37 
outcomes and, therefore, an increase of the husband market wage directly translates into 
an increase of the opportunity set of the whole family. 
The following propositions describe the opposite situation. 
Proposition 2.3 Given Assumption 2.1, a positive variation of j's market wage decreases 
i 's reservation wage function w~J if and only if the difference between j 's labour supply 
curves in the two participation regimes ~J - ~ is negative and the income effect is weaker 
[i _p -· ow' 
than j's difference in labour supplies, that is if PJ P > l~ ---tf-L Z? J y 
With the following effect on the participation frontier. 
Proposition 2.4 If i 's reservation wage function w~J decreases as Wj increases, then 
the participation frontier, dividing the wage loci in which both spouses work P and only j 
works PJ, is downwards sloping. 
Again, let us think at j as if it were the husband and i the wife. Then, Proposition 2.4 
argues that as husband's market wage raises the wife reservation wage decreases making in 
this way her labour participation more likely to occur even for low level of market wages. 
In interpreting condition (2.19), we have omitted the result that j's difference in 
labour supplies T~J - T~ divided by i labour supply ~ can be equal to the income effect 
~J ( ow~Jj{)y) . If it is the case, i's reservation wage would be not affected by changes 
of j's market wage and, in turn, the participation frontier would be not affected by wage 
variations. 
Neither Spouse Works 
According to the reservation wage functions (2.7) and (2.8), when both spouses do not 
work the reservation wage is function of market prices and nonlabour income only. Hence 
in the wage plane the participation frontier, dividing the labour participation regimes 
in which neither spouse works and only one spouse works, is not affected by changes of 
market wages. Generally, one can measure an income effect only and, given Assumption 
2.1, reservation wages have a positive relationship with nonlabour income, and reservation 
38 
wages increase (decrease) as nonlabour income increases (decreases). 5 
In Figures 2.1 to 2.4 we give a graphical intuition of the analysis described in this 
section. The participation frontier is represented in the locus of spouses' market wages and 
it divides the market wage plane in four regions. Each participation region is characterized 
by an opportunity set such that the spouses are jointly better off either of them working 
P, neither of them working N, or one working and the other not Pi. 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 represent the two polar results discussed in Propositions 2.2 and 
2.4. In Figure 2.1 the reservation wage function of both spouses is positively affected by 
marginal positive variations of the market wage of the working spouse. In Figure 2.2 the 
reservation wage function of both spouses decreases as the market wage of the working 
spouse mcreases. 
On the other hand, Figure 2.3 and 2.4 depict the situations in which marginal variations 
of the market wage operate in opposite direction on the spouses' reservation wage. In 
particular, looking at Figure 2.3 we have that a positive variation of the husband wage 
has a negative effect on the wife reservation wage function and, conversely, a positive 
variation of the wife wage raises the reservation wage of the husband. In Figure 2.4 the 
opposite situation is illustrated. 
2.4 Family Labour Participation within the Collective Model 
We now turn to the analysis of labour participation within the collective framework. We 
first introduce the standard rational collective model of household behaviour and then 
extend it to corner solutions. As stated in Section 2.2, households are made up of married 
couples only. The couple faces a budget constraint that limits the private consumption of 
market goods and leisure of the two spouses. The budget constraint takes the usual linear 
market form PJCJ + PmCm = EiEf,m wizi + y, where Pi are market prices of the composite 
good privately consumed by each individual and the right-hand side is the full household 
5 Generally, reservation wages are function of demographic characteristics, as education level, age, sex 
and so forth, and one may empirically observe and measure changing in the level of reservation wage due 
to at variations on demographic attributes. However, from a theoretical point of view these changing may 
have ambiguous sings. 
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income composed of earned incomes Ei wizi, when spouses work, and household nonlabour 
mcome y. 
The collective household model relies on two assumptions. 
Assumption 2.2 (Individual Preferences) Individual preferences are assumed to be 
represented by an egoistic strictly quasi-concave utility function, continuously differentiable 
and strictly increasing in its elements 
Providing for consumption of private goods only, we do not take into account either the 
consumption of public goods or externalities within families. Although we recognize that 
this assumption is a severe restriction in a household model, it allows to recover individ-
ual preferences and to characterize the decision process observing household consumption 
rather than individual (Chiappori 1992). Moreover, we assume that leisure 1-li is privately 
consumed by both spouses. Fong and Zhang (2001) consider a more general model where 
leisure can be consumed both privately and publicly. Although the two alternative uses are 
not empirically distinguishable, they can be identified in general, provided that the con-
sumption of another exclusive good is observed. It is important to underline that "egoistic" 
preferences are not necessary to recover the individual behaviour and the collective set-
up can be extended to a caring utility function 7i = iJi [Uf (cf, 1 -lf), um (em, 1 -lm)] 
without altering the conclusions of the model (Chiappori 1992). 
As we assume in Section 2.2, the household utility function Wh is represented by a 
Bergson function 
(2.20) 
Different from the unitary model, the Pareto weight P, is in general assumed to depend on 
the variables6 that enter the budget constraint and is assumed continuously differentiable 
6 Recently, Basu (2006) challenges the common assumption of exogeneity of the sharing rule. He argues 
that what determines the bargaining power of member i is not just her wage rate but rather what she 
actually earns, that is wili. Since zi is a variable of choice, J.L gets influenced by the family's decision and 
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in its arguments. Basically, Ji captures the balance of power in the family and determines 
the final allocation on the Pareto frontier. If Ji = 1 then the household behaves as though 
member f is the effective household dictator, whereas Ji = 0 it is the opposite scenario. For 
intermediate values of Ji, the household behaves as though each spouse has some decision 
power. In general, in labour supply models the distribution index Ji is made to depend on 
wages and nonlabour income. The value of Ji may also depend on variables that influence 
the balance of power without affecting both the value of individual utility functions and 
the household opportunity set. In literature these variables are referred to as distribution 
factors. 
Assumption 2.3 (Pareto Efficiency) Household decisions are assumed to result in Pareto-
efficient outcomes. 
This assumption does not necessarily imply "harmony" between spouses, thus a col-
lective model may also describe families experiencing marriage dissolution. The rationale 
motivation of Assumption 2.3 is that efficient allocations are likely to emerge from re-
peated interactions in stationary environments and households are an example of such 
an environment. However, there can be situations in which the efficient assumption may 
fail to apply. An example can be when existing social norms impose some patterns of 
behaviour that deviate from efficient outcomes (Udry 1996). Inefficient outcomes are also 
plausible for decisions that are not taken frequently, for instance fertility and education 
choices (Lundberg and Pollak 2003), which imply that the repeated game argument cannot 
be applied. 
Formally, without public goods and externalities, the assumption of Pareto efficient 
household decisions implies that for any given price-income bundle (p J, Pm, w f, Wm, Y) 
there exists an exogenous weighting function Ji belonging to [0, 1] such that (d, 1 -li) for 
hence the balance of power is endogenous to the household choice. 
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i = f, m solves the following constrained program 
(2.21) 
and z! E [0, 1], zm E [0, 1]. 
For interior solutions the first-order conditions, in terms of marginal rate of substitutions, 
are 
uz~ Wj 
uf 
cf PJ 
ur;;, Wm 
u;;;. Pm 
that represent the conventional efficient conditions. The household utility function Wh 
is additively separable in the individual consumption-leisure choices implying that i's 
marginal rate of substitutions are independent of j's consumption-leisure choices and vice 
versa. Hence the household model can be solved using a two-stage budgeting procedure 
that in the collective model translates into the "sharing rule approach." The system of the 
first-order conditions together with the budget constraint 
generate the following labour supplies 
1! p (2.22) 
lp (2.23) 
Prices and nonlabour income in the household utility function lead to a specific charac-
terization of the collective model. Interior maxima derived by price dependent preferences 
4:2 
(2.20) do not exhibit all the properties of the traditional demand theory. In particular, 
they do not satisfy the symmetry of the Slutsky matrix (Pollak 1977, Browning and Chi-
appori 1998). Browning and Chiappori (1998) generalize the Slutsky conditions to the 
collective model. They find that the substitution matrix must satisfy the SNRl condition. 
This condition states that the collective Slutsky matrix is made of a symmetric, negative 
semi-definite matrix and a rank one matrix. The rank one matrix originates from the shift 
of the Pareto weight due to changes in prices, wages and nonlabour income. 
Furthermore, in programs where binding maxima are present, such as the analysis of 
this chapter, price dependent preferences lead to further economic irregularities. Pre-
cisely, unless specific assumptions are added to the bargaining power structure or to 
the reservation wage function, uniqueness of the reservation wage functions fails to ex-
ist and, consequently, the participation (nonparticipation) frontier cannot be uniquely 
drawn. Therefore, the reservation wage theory could not be a suitable approach to model 
collective behaviour with corner solutions. 
In order to show this negative result, we use equation (2.22) to find the wife's reser-
vation wage when the couple is better off when she does not work and her husband does 
work. Employing the reservation wage approach, as done in Section 2.2, we wo!J.ld set her 
labour supply equation equal to zero 
and then would solve it with respect to Wf. However, since the Pareto weight Ji depends 
also on w f there can be many wage rates for which she is indifferent between working or not 
working and a unique characterization of the collective model with corner solutions may 
not be feasible. Comparable findings can be obtained for the other labour participation 
regimes. To be clear we illustrate this result by means of the following example. 
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Example 2.4 Recall the interior solution of spouses' labour supply in Example 1 
lm 1 - ( 1 - J-L) (3m (w + + ) f Wm Y, 
Wm 
here, without loss of generality, we assume that ai + (3i = 1 fori = f, m and set lit = li 
and lim = 1- li· Now, within the collective framework the Pareto weight li is in general 
specified as a function of variables that enter the budget constraint. For the sake of the 
example, let us suppose that li = ;;;! with Wm > Wf, f's labour supply becomes 
and m's labour supply is 
Now, to derive the reservation wage function for the spouses we apply the standard reser-
vation wage theory as we do within the unitary model. Given the specified structure of 
the household model, when the husband finds it optimal to work, the wife has a unique 
reservation wage function equal to 
On the other hand, when the wife works, the husband reservation wage function is the 
solution of the following quadratic equation 
that in general the solution of this equation does not lead to a unique reservation wage 
function. The asymmetry between spouses's reservation wages is a direct consequence 
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of the particular functional form chosen for the Pareto weight and it does not derive by 
the rational behaviour of individuals. In household models aiming at estimating occupation 
decisions then we could find it conceivable that for different occupation decisions individuals 
have different reservation wages. However, for the discrete choice "whether to participate 
or not participate in the labour market" rationality implies that individuals have just one 
"subjective" wage. 
To overcome the latter shortcoming, crucial in empirical analysis with corner solutions, 
Blundell et al. (2007) and Donni (2003) postulate that the reservation wage is a contraction 
with respect to market wages. 7 The reservation wage function thus has a unique fixed 
point with respect to w f and Wm and when both spouses do not work, there will exist 
one and only one pair of wages such that both spouses are indifferent between working 
and not working. On the other hand, when member i does not work, there will exist 
a reservation wage functions of Wj and y such that member i participates in the labour 
market if and only if her market wage is greater than her reservation wage. Consequently, 
the participation set is partitioned into four connected sets with a unique intersection. 
Conversely, we take a different approach. Precisely,8 
Assumption 2.4 We assume that the Pareto weight ji is a continuous function of indi-
vidual expected wages, E (wi) for i-f,m, market prices, Pt and Pm, and nonlabour income 
y. 
We think of the expected wage as a prediction of the wage that an agent would get 
if she were to enter the labour force. It can depend on past working experience and 
demographic characteristics of the agent as well on macro-economic indicators. As a 
consequence of Assumption 2.4, the reservation wage theory can be employed to described 
7 Let X be a metric space. A mapping T : X ----+X is called contraction map· if there exists a constant 
c with 0::::; c < 1 such that d(T(x), T(y)) ::::; cd(x, y), x, y EX. An economic application of the contraction 
mapping theorem is to prove the fixed-point theorems in metric spaces. In other words, a contraction 
mapping maps a set into a proper subset of itself. 
8 Assumption 2.4 is a special application of Pollak (1977). In a model with price dependent utility 
functions, Pollak (1977) distinguishes between current market wages, the wages that enter the budget 
constraint, and normal wages, those that influence preferences alone. Generally, the normal wage function 
defines normal wages as a function of current and past wages. However, two polar specification are feasible. 
One specification defines normal wages depending exclusively on current wages. The easiest case is the 
one in which normal wages depend on past wages but not on current wages. 
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the labour participation of spouses also in the context of the collective model. As described 
later, in terms of characterization of the participation decisions, this specification of the 
Pareto weight jj leads to similar results of the unitary model: in each participation regime 
Assumption 2.4 ensures that spouses have a unique reservation wage function. 9 Potentially, 
expected wages E (wi) can depend on current market wages. However, within the collective 
model it would imply that individual reservation wages are not identified. Therefore, in 
the analysis of labour participation of family members within a collective model we do not 
assume that individual expected wages are function of current market wages. 
It is worth remarking that both Blundell et al. (2007) and Donni (2003) specify the 
Pareto weight jj as a function of current market wages even when spouses do not work. 
Behind this assumption is the idea that when spouses do not work they might exert their 
bargaining power within the family on the grounds of their potential wage defined as 
the current market wage that they may earn entering the labour force. This amounts to 
assume that agents have perfect information on labour market performances and, in turn, 
on the wage that they would earn entering the labour force. Differently, we state that 
when a spouse does not work it is likely that her voice within the family depends, among 
other variables, on her expected wage. 
Similar to the corner solution analysis of Section 2.2, under Assumption 2.4 the labour 
decision of the couple can be represented by the following necessary conditions and, in 
addition, the efficient conditions derived by the collective household model are equal to 
those obtained within the unitary household model. 
Both Spouses Participate, p: {z! > 0, zm > O,pfef + Pmem = Wjlf + Wmlm + y} 
Spouses jointly participate in the labour force if and only if 
uf (ef 1 _z!) 
Zf ' 
uff (ef, 1- Zf) 
Wf 
PJ 
up. (em, 1 _zm) 
and u:;p;, (em' 1 _zm) Pm 
9 Assumption 2.4 implies that the sharing rule function depends, among other variables, on expected 
wages rather than current market wages. 
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and their optimal labour supply equations are 
1! p (2.24) 
frp (2.25) 
where the Pareto weight is Ji = J.L(PJ,Pm,E(wJ) ,E(wm) ,y). The individual demands for 
........ ....... 
leisure are L"p = 1-l"p fori= j, m. When both spouses work the optimal welfare reached 
by the family is W~(PJ,Pm, Wf, Wm, y, Ji). 
Setting i's labour equation~ equal to zero we find the reservation wage of member i 
by solving for Wi 
*i i ( ~) f . f 
'Wp. = 'Wp. w1·, y, J.L , or z = , m, J J 
that gives the marginal value of time at which i is indifferent between working or not 
working when the other spouse finds it optimal to supply a positive amount of working 
hours. 
Wife Does Not Participate and Husband Participates, PM: {lf = 0, zm > 0, 
P!ef + Pmem = Wmlm + Y} 
The regime in which the wife chooses not to work and the husband to work will be optimal 
if and only if 
ur:;,_ (em, 1-lm) Wm 
and --U:Jn (em, 1 _zm) Pm 
The husband supplies the following positive number of working hours 
lpM = lpM (PJ,Pm, Wm, y, J.L (pj,Pm, E (wj), E (wm), y)), 
and the individuals demands for leisure are L?M = 1 -l?M and L~M = 1. In this labour 
regime at the optimum the family gets a welfare level equal to W~M(Pj,Pm,Wm,y,ji). 
Solving the labour equation frpM with respect to Wm we find the expression for the 
husband reservation wage when the wife is not working 
Wife Participates and Husband Does Not Participate, Pp: {z! > 0, zm = 0, 
P!ef + Pmem = Wjlf + y} 
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Similarly, the regime where the wife works and the husband does not work will be optimal 
if and only if 
u ~ ( ef' 1 - z!) - w f 
U f, ( ef, 1 - Zf) P f U{{;. (em, 1) Wm and > -. U:J;, (em, 1) Pm 
The wife find it optimal to supply the following positive number of working hours 
with individual leisure demands equal to L~F = 1 - ~F and L[JF 1. In this labour 
regime, the optimal level of household welfare is w~F (p f' Pm, w f' y' 11). 
Solving the labour equation ~F with respect to WJ we have the expression for the wife 
reservation wage when the husband is not working 
Both Spouses Do Not Participate, N: {z! = 0, zm = O,pfef + Pmem = y} 
Finally, the optimal choice of the couple is not to work if and only if 
spouses allocate all their time to leisure, thus L~ = 1, L!J = 1. The optimal welfare level 
of the family is W~(PJ,Pm, y, J1).1° 
10 Given a specific functional form to the individual utility functions of wife and husband, reservation 
wages can be calculated for both spouses in each of the four different participation regimes. The algebraic 
derivation of the reservation wages is illustrated in examples 2.1-2.4. 
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2.5 Characterization of the Collective Model 
In this section, we show the testable implications for leisure demands generated by the 
collective household model characterized by Assumptions 2.2-2.4. In particular, we per-
form the Slutsky equation for the four participation regimes and, in addition, characterize 
the participation frontier. The analysis is thus similar to that of Section 2.3. 
2.5.1 The Slutsky Equation for Collective Leisure Demands 
Both Spouses Work 
When both spouses work the Slutsky equation derived by the individual labour equations 
(2.24) and (2.25) is equal to11 
sfj = L~i - ( 1 - L~) Lt - Lh ( ( 1 - L~) !Ly) , i, j = J, m. 
In matrix terms, the generalized substitution matrix can be written as 
Sc-p-
[ 
Sii Sij ] 
Sji Sjj 
+DJ.L ·v', both spouses work, 
(2.26) 
where the vector DJ.L is of general term Lh and the vector v' is of general term (1- U) ILy· 
Thus the collective Slutsky matrix is the sum of a conventional Slutsky matrix Sp, with 
the usual properties of negativity and symmetry, and an additional matrix R that is the 
product of a column vector DJ.L and a row vector v. Browning and Chiappori (1998) show 
that the matrix R has at most rank one. It is worth remarking that in Browning and 
11 When both spouses work, i's demand for leisure is equal to 
where the Pareto weight is Ji, = 11 (p f, Pm, E ( w f) , E ( wm) , y) . We can define the Slutsky equation of the 
individual reduced demand for leisure i}, (pi, Pi, Wi, Wj, y) by its general term 
Sij = i~j - (1- it) it. 
Noticing that i'!nj = L'!nj and it = Lt + L~f.ly, the Slutsky equation can be written as 
s~i = L~j - ( 1- Lt) Lt- L~ ( 1- Lt) f.ly, 
that represents the Slutsky equation of the individual structural demand for leisure L}, (Pi, pj, Wi, Wj, y, Ji,). 
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Chiappori (1998) the vector v comprises price and income effects that are generated by 
the Pareto weight. Differently, given Assumption 2.4 the vector v is reduced to income 
effects only. This feature, however, may not affect the rank condition of the matrix R. 
Only One Spouse Works 
When only i works the Slutsky equation derived by i's leisure demand is 
that satisfies the same property of equation (2.26). Since j does not work, the compensated 
cross-wage effect cannot be obviously performed . 
2.5.2 Characterization of the Participation Frontier 
In this section, the effects on the reservation wage function of changing market wages and 
nonlabour income are considered. Since the analysis is carried out as done in Section 2.3.2 
we briefly present the algebraic passages and then highlight possible differences. 
When only member j is working the participation frontier is defined by the following 
equality 
(2.27) 
where wj£J = w~J (Pi,Pj, Wj, y, jj) is the wife reservation wage and jj = J1 (pf,Pm, E (wf), 
E (wm), y) is the Pareto weight. 
Keeping market prices constant, the total differential of equation (2.27) is equal to 
Cancelling out common terms and using Roy's identity 
this expression becomes 
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(2.28) 
awh 
..::....:.:.... 
*f 
where we have substituted the individual labour supplies derived by Roy's identity, 
8?1.' = 
8Wp 
awh 
_!J_ 
"'z~ d~ p· pan ~h = P. 8Wp J 
~
8y 
Differentiating the budget constraint in PJ we have the expression of dy 
substituting it into equation (2.28) and re-arranging terms we obtain 
8yf 
(2.29) 
Comparing equation (2.29) with equation (2.19) we observe that they differ for the 
{Jwi 
additional income effect 8;.J ~ generated by the Pareto weight Ji. It is plausible that 
positive variations of the nonlabour income has the effect of increasing the Pareto weight. 
Therefore, within the collective approach to family labour participation presented in the 
8wi 
chapter, the Pareto weight has the effect to strengthens the income effect a:.J and Propo-
sition 3.2 is more likely to occur. 
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2. 6 Conclusions 
Although economists have widely recognized the important role played by individualism in 
modeling family behaviour, there is still no agreement on which approach better represents 
household behaviour. It is likely that household decisions, such as labour participation or 
fertility choices, involve a bargaining process between the spouses. On the other hand, 
it can be the case that decisions taken on a daily basis, such as food consumption, do 
not require a bargaining approach to model household behaviour. The labour participa-
tion analysis presented here is thus studied employing both the unitary and the collective 
models. For each household model we derive properties that can be tested using appro-
priate household data helping researchers in the choice of the "ideal" household model to 
represent family labour participation. 
The chapter starts with the analysis of labour participation decisions of married couples 
within the unitary model. Household preferences are assumed to be additively separable 
in the individual utility function of the spouses and the budget constraint is assumed to be 
linear. Within this framework, we find that the reservation wage theory leads to a complete 
characterization of the labour participation decision. For each spouse we derive a set of 
reservation wages in different labour participation regimes that allows to characterize the 
participation frontier. As a result, the participation frontier divides the market wage plane 
in four regions. Each region is characterized by an opportunity set such that the spouses 
are jointly better off either of them working, neither of them working, or one working and 
the other not. 
We then analyse the labour participation decision within the collective model. We show 
that the standard assumptions underlying the collective model, that is Pareto-efficiency, 
egoistic individual preferences and private consumption, are not sufficient to provide a 
unique derivation of the reservation wage function and, in turn, the existence of a well-
behaved participation set. This result is in line with previous works (Blundell et al. 2007, 
Donni 2003). 
To overcome the latter shortcoming, Blundell et al. (2007) and Donni (2003) postulate 
that the reservation wage is a contraction with respect to market wages. The reservation 
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wage function thus has a unique fixed point with respect to individual market wages and 
when both spouses do not work, there will exist one and only one pair of wages such that 
both spouses are indifferent between working and not working. On the other hand, when 
member i does not work, there will exist a reservation wage functions of Wj and y such 
that member i participates in the labour market if and only if her market wage is greater 
than her reservation wage. Consequently, the participation set is partitioned into four 
connected sets with a unique intersection. 
Conversely, we take a different approach. We assume that the Pareto weight Ji is 
a continuous function of individual expected wages rather than current market wages. 
The expected wages are defined as a prediction of the wage that an agent would get 
if she were to enter the labour force. It can depend on past working experience and 
demographic characteristics of the agent as well on macro-economic indicators. As a 
result, the reservation wage theory can be applied to described the labour participation 
of spouses also in the context of the collective model. As described in the chapter, under 
the assumption that the Pareto weight is function of expected wages rather than current 
market wages, completeness of the reservation wage theory is re-established. This entails 
that the characterization of the participation frontier is similar to that obtain within the 
unitary model of household labour participation. 
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FIGURE 2.1: Participation Frontier When Spouses' Reservation Wages Are Positively Af-
fected by Wage Variations 
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FIGURE 2.2: Participation Frontier When Spouses' Reservation Wages Are Negatively Af-
fected by Wage Variations 
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FIGURE 2.3: Participation Frontier When Female's Reservation Wage Is Negatively Af-
fected and Male's Reservation Wage Is Positively Affected by Wage Varia-
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FIGURE 2.4: Participation Frontier When Female's Reservation Wage Is Positively Af-
fected and Male's Reservation Wage Is Negatively Affectd by Wage Varia-
tions 
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Chapter 3 
Separability and Joint Production 
in the Collective Household Model 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a collective approach to household behaviour with production and 
consumption-leisure decisions. In particular, we follow the approach initiated by Apps 
and Rees (1997) and Chiappori (1997). The household is seen as engaged jointly in pro-
duction and consumption-leisure decisions. Within this setting the household is involved 
in producing domestic goods by transforming input factors. We omit purchased inputs 
and in the model factor demands are working hours supplied by family members. At the 
same time, the household chooses the optimal consumption of market-purchased goods, 
leisure, and domestic goods produced by the family. Thus the two decision processes must 
be integrated into one single problem. 
In order to analyze the household as a collection of individuals rather than as an 
undifferentiated unitary decision unit, the production-consumption household model is 
then extended to embrace the recent results introduced by Chiappori (1988, 1992, 1997). 
The collective household model relies on quite general assumptions. In particular, each 
agent has her own utility function and equilibrium outcomes are Pareto-efficient. The 
efficiency assumption simply implies that the household's outcome is located on the utility 
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Pareto frontier and the particular location depends on the decision process of the family. 
However, the mechanism used by the family members to reach an agreement between them 
remains unspecified. 
Within the collective set-up the household decision process takes place as follows. 
First, according to a predetermined exogenous rule household members divide the total 
nonlabour income between them. Then, each agent independently chooses her own optimal 
consumption bundle subject to her individual total amount of resources. 
In the original work of Chiappori it is assumed that individual time is allocated only 
between market labour and leisure. This assumption neglects that a part of the individ-
ual time is spent in housework activities and that the decision of nonparticipation in the 
outside marketplace can be explained as a rational choice of working at home. More-
over, including household production might lead to inconsistent results concerning the 
conditions of the recoverability of the collective structure or concerning welfare analyses. 
The contribution of Apps and Rees (1997) shares this spirit. Apps and Rees (1997) 
argue that failure to utilize Becker's (1965) insight can give rise to misleading welfare 
conclusions. For instance, there can be an equal distribution of market resources but an 
unequal distribution of household full income. Moreover, a low level of market labour 
supply will automatically be interpreted as a large consumption of leisure, whereas it 
may reflect the specialization of one of the members in domestic production. Therefore, 
they introduce the domestic sector in the general framework of Chiappori. They conclude 
that the extension of Chiappori's collective models to household production may lead to 
problems of identification of the sharing rule, unless further assumptions are introduced 
in the household framework. Notice that Apps and Rees (1997) consider the case of 
nonmarketable domestic goods only. Under the assumption of marketable domestic goods, 
Donni (2005) formally shows that omitting the domestic production in collective models 
of labour supply produces a bias in welfare analyses. 
On the other hand, in a model with household production, Chiappori (1997) clearly 
distinguishes between nonmarketable and marketable domestic goods and then he studies 
the implications on the identification of the household model structure of accounting for 
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domestic production. In the marketable production case, he shows that testable restric-
tions on domestic and market labour supply functions can be derived and the sharing rule 
can be recovered up to an additive constant. In the nonmarket case, the sharing rule can 
be derived up to an additive function of wages and the underlying structure of the model 
is identifiable only if the domestic production exhibits constant returns to scale. However, 
imposing additional assumptions on the decision process, identification of the sharing rule 
up to an additive constant is still possible. 
From an empirical viewpoint, using household data that provide individual information 
on demographic attributes, and a detailed information on individual time use, earnings 
and nonlabour income, Apps and Rees (1996) estimate and compare the results of two 
collective models, a model with household production and a model without. In the model 
accounting for household production the authors implicitly assume nontradeable domestic 
goods and a production function with constant returns to scale. In the model without 
domestic activities they estimate individual demand systems for market goods and leisure 
consumption. Comparing the estimations, Apps and Rees (1996) show that the two sys-
tems yield conflicting results concerning behavioural response, such as wage and income 
elasticities, and the allocation of nonlabour income within the household members. Using 
Swedish data, Aronsson, Sven-Olov, and Magnus (2001) estimate two collective models 
with household production. In particular, in one model the domestic good has a market 
and in the other it is assumed to be not marketable. They show that leisure demands 
and household production are significantly influenced by the presence of children and the 
education of household members. 
Recently, Rapoport, Sofer, and Solaz (2003) extend the econometric identification 
strategy of the sharing rule presented in Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix (2002) to the 
case of household production. They distinguish between market and nonmarket domestic 
goods. In the former case, given a production function with non-increasing returns to 
scale, they show that the sharing rule can be identified up to an additive constant. On 
the other hand, if the domestic good is nonmarketable the sharing rule can be derived up 
to an additive constant assuming a production function with constant returns to scale. 
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They estimate the sharing rule with and without household production. Comparing the 
results of the two estimated sharing rules, they find that the estimated parameters differ 
among the models and, in addition, taking into account household production increases 
robustness of the estimations. 
The existing literature on collective household models is thus concerned to show that 
the sharing rule can be identified even when household production is taken into account. 
However, a central question, both in development economics (Bardhan and Udry 1999) 
and in the theory of the farm-household (Singh, Squire, and Strauss 1986), is whether 
production choices are separable from consumption-leisure decisions of the family. When 
the separation property holds, the household can make its production decisions inde-
pendently of its consumption and labour-supply decisions. The production side affects 
consumption and labour supply just through income effects and production decisions are 
entirely independent of consumption and labour supply decisions. A crucial consequence 
is that to model production-consumption household choices we can use recursive models. 
Thus, whether the separation property can be applied has important implications on the 
structure of the household model and on the estimation of the model. 
In the context of the unitary framework, a number of works have studied the sepa-
ration property both from a theoretical and an empirical point of view (see among oth-
ers Benjamin 1992, Chayanov 1986, Lopez 1984, Sen 1966, Singh, Squire, and Strauss 
1986). Conversely, in the collective literature the separation property is not properly ac-
counted for. Chiappori (1997) points to the separation property between production and 
consumption-leisure decisions but then his analysis is confined to show that the decision 
process is identifiable also taking into account production activities of the family. 
In general, collective models with household production assume that in the first stage 
of the decision process household members agree on a rule to share nonlabour income and 
resources produced by the production activities. As a consequence, it is implicitly assumed 
that the production decision is always separable from the consumption-leisure choices. 
However, using recursive models inappropriately can produce misleading representations 
of the household behaviour in many respects. From an econometric point of view, it 
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results in excluding relevant variables in the functional form specification of the production 
variables leading to biased estimations. As will be illustrated in the chapter, substitution 
and income effects differ significantly between recursive and nonrecursive models leading 
to different Slutsky conditions. 
Nonseparability between production and consumption may arise under a wide range of 
circumstances. It is potentially present whenever the market of at least one production-
consumption good is missing. If markets are missing, the implicit price of the domestic good 
is endogenous to household behaviour and the separation property between production and 
consumption decisions might not hold. On the other hand, if markets are complete, the 
household production and individual labour can be sold on the market, or, the same goods 
and services can be bought on the market at a given price. Hence, households are price 
takers for every good and production decisions are taken independently from consumption 
and leisure decisions. 
We study the production-consumption household model under the assumptions of com-
plete and absent markets for the domestic good. We find the conditions of market's 
structures and/ or household technology that ensure separability between production and 
consumption-leisure decisions. These conditions are general in the sense that they can 
be applied to cooperative household models as well to noncooperative household mod-
els. In addition, we perform a qualitative analysis for the household models developed 
under different market structures. In doing so, we extend the generalized Slutsky equa-
tion derived by Browning and Chiappori (1998) to collective models with marketable and 
nonmarketable domestic goods. 
The chapter opens with the analysis of complete markets. Existence of markets for 
consumption goods and labour supply assure that prices do not vary by agents. Under this 
circumstance, the family produces an aggregated output that can be sold at a given market 
price or privately consumed by each household member. The price of the domestic good 
is determined on the marketplace and the separation property between production and 
consumption-leisure choices holds. As a consequence, the household decides the optimal 
production plan independently of its optimal consumption-leisure bundle. Conversely, the 
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consumption-leisure choices are affected by the production activities of the family through 
profit effects. 
In the subsequent sections the marketable assumption of the domestic good is re-
laxed and, therefore, the implicit price of the domestic good is jointly determined by the 
household's choices. Moreover, we model the household production by means of joint 
technologies: with the same variable inputs and technology the family produces two out-
puts privately consumed by each member. Within this framework, first we analyze the 
production-consumption household model assuming a production technology with con-
stant returns to scale. Under the circumstance of absent markets, we find that constant 
returns to scale are sufficient to ensure that the implicit domestic price does not depend 
on household tastes and, in turn, it ensures the separability between production and 
consumption-leisure choices. 
Then, we assume nonconstant returns to scale. We show that the implicit price of 
the domestic good depends on the production-consumption variables and, therefore, the 
household model must be solved jointly with consumption-leisure decisions. In general, 
within collective models nonseparability of production and consumption-leisure choices has 
negative consequences on the household model structure. In particular, the consumption-
leisure choices cannot be modelled as it were a two-stage budgeting process meaning that 
the sharing rule approach cannot be employed. This finding has crucial consequence 
for empirical applications. As pointed out by Browning, Chiappori, and Lewbel (2006) 
identification of the Pareto weight requires to know the unobservable cardinalization of 
member utilities. Therefore, to provide identification of the structural model one need to 
know those cardinalizations and results may strongly depend on the cardinalization chosen 
by researchers. In addition, in accord with previous findings (Pollak and Watcher 1975), 
due to joint technologies a closed-form solution to the production-consumption household 
model cannot be found. 
In order to provide a solution to these two drawbacks, that is to find models with 
closed-form solutions and to implement the sharing rule approach, we propose two al-
ternative specifications of the production function, though we recognize that they may 
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model very specific household productions. In both alternatives we abstract from joint-
ness in production. A first alternative assumes that domestic goods are produced using 
two distinct production functions in which both household members allocate a part of 
their time. Without joint technologies the production-consumption household model has 
a closed-form solution. However, it cannot be extended to the sharing rule approach. In 
the second alternative each household member produces by herself the domestic good that 
she consumes. The advantage of the latter is that, given an appropriate exogenous sharing 
rule, the household program can be decentralized into two individual programs in which 
each member chooses production and consumption variables jointly, but independently of 
production-consumption decisions of the other member. 
3.2 Marketable Domestic Goods 
Formally the model is set-up as follows. Households are composed of two members, f and 
m, and each of them privately consumes a composite market good in quantity ci, a home-
produced good consumed in quantity zi and leisure in quantity Li. We assume that both 
members are employed in production processes both inside and outside the family. We 
assume that the household technology to produce zP can be represented by a generalized 
production function 
where h(.) represents the household technology used to produce the domestic good zP 
and it is assumed strictly increasing, twice differentiable and concave. ti are hours that 
each member devotes to the household activities. The household technology can exhibit 
constant or nonconstant returns to scale. However, in this section we do not restrict the 
technology to any particular scale. It is worth noticing that zP is the quantity of output 
produced by the family that can be sold in the market or consumed by the family members. 
The two-member household faces a budget constraint that limits its total consumption 
given by 
m m 
PJCJ + PmCm + Pz 2:: zi = 2:: wizi + y + PzZP, (3.1) 
i=f i=f 
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where Pi and Pz 1 are the prices of the market-purchased good and the household good 
respectively, Wi is the market wage, andy is the household nonlabour income. 
Each household member faces a time constraint-she cannot allocate more time to 
market employment li, leisure Li, and household production ti, than the total time avail-
able to each of them 
for i = j, m where Ti is the total stock of i 's time. 
Before describing the production-consumption household decision process we introduce 
the following set of assumptions. The first two assumptions are standard in collective 
models and the last is related to the production side of the model. 
Assumption 3.1 (Individual Preferences) In a collective household model individual 
preferences are assumed to be represented by an egoistic strictly quasi-concave utility func-
tion, continuously differentiable and strictly increasing in its elements 
Throughout the chapter, we only provide for consumption of private goods and ig-
nore both the consumption of public goods and externalities within the family. Although 
we recognize that this assumption is a severe restriction in a household model, it allows 
to recover individual preferences and to characterize the decision process observing only 
household consumption rather than individual consumption (Chiappori 1992). Therefore, 
we assume that also leisure Li and the domestic good zi are privately consumed by house-
hold members. Fong and Zhang (2001) consider a more general model where leisure can be 
consumed both privately and publicly. Although the two alternative uses are not empiri-
cally distinguishable, they can be identified in general, provided that the consumption of 
another exclusive good is observed. On the other hand, using a sample of British couples 
drawn from the British Household Panel Survey, Couprie (2007) provides an econometric 
identification of the sharing rule based on a model in which the domestic good is treated 
1 Without loss of generality, we assume that z! and z= have the same market price Pz. 
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as a public good. 
It is also important to underline that for interior maxima "egoistic" preferences are not 
necessary to recover the individual behaviour, and the collective set-up may be extended 
to a caring utility function ui = fji [Ui ( ci, zi, Li) , Ui ( d, zi, U) J without altering the 
conclusions of the model (Chiappori 1992).2 
Assumption 3.2 (Pareto-Efficiency) Household decisions are assumed to result in Pareto-
efficient outcomes, that is the resource allocation ( cf, em, z!, zm, Lf, Lm, tf, tm) chosen by 
the household is such that no other 1easible allocation (c' f c'm z' f z'm L' f L'm t' f t'm) 
J' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
could make both members better off. 
Spouses are engaged in a long-term relationship with good symmetric information 
about each others choices and the assumption of Pareto-efficiency in the context of house-
hold behaviour is sensible.3 The assumption of Pareto-efficiency implies that given an 
allocation of household resources the maximization problem can be decentralized by ap-
plying the second theorem of welfare economics. 
Assumption 3.3 (Complete Markets) All markets are assumed to be complete and 
competitive. 
2 In order to show that caring utility funcitions allow to solve household collective models using a two 
stage budgeting procedure, consider the following simplified household model with caring individual utility 
function and without domestic production 
with f-LJ = J-L and f-Lm = 1 - J-L, subjet to the household budget constraint 2::;~1 PiCi + 2:::1 WiLi = 
"L::f WiTi + y. 
The marginal utilities of individual i with respect to the variables of choice are 
-i f -j f 
J-LiUuiU Lf + J-LiUUi ULf 6wi, 
for i i= j = J, m, 5 is the lagrangean multiplier. i's marginal rate of substitution is then equal to 
that does not depend either on j's preferences or on the decision process f.L· This implies that the household 
model can be solved using a two stage budgeting procedure. 
3See Udry (1996) for an empirical rejection of the Pareto efficiency assumption using a sample of farm 
households from Burkina Faso. 
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Assumption 3.3 establishes that both individual labour supply and household pro-
duction can be sold on the outside markets, wages and prices are determined on the 
marketplace and households are price-takers. Therefore, with well-organized markets the 
household product zP can be entirely consumed by the family or partly /fully sold on the 
outside market.4 
An established result is that perfect markets are a sufficient condition to ensure sep-
arability between production and consumption decisions without imposing any other re-
strictions on household technology. However, we show that complete markets are sufficient 
but not necessary for separability. In Section 3.3 we will relax Assumption 3.3 and show 
that under the restriction of a production technology with constant returns to scale the 
household program is still separable. Precisely, we show that the separation property holds 
whenever households are price-takers or implicit prices are not affected by household pref-
erences. 
The production and consumption optimal decisions of the household then must be the 
solution of the following constrained maximisation program 
max Wh = litUf (cf, z!, £f)+ JimUm (em, zm, Lm)' 
cf ,zf ,Lf ,em ,zm ,Lm, 
(3.2) 
zP,tf ,tm 
subject to zP = h(tf, tm), and 
m m m m m . 
E PiCi + Pz E Zi + E WiLi = E WiTi + Y + PzZP - .E Witt, 
i=f i=f i=f i=f t=f 
with nonnegativity constraints on each component ofTi, that is Li > 0, ti > 0, zi > 0 fori= 
j, m.5 Notice that the individual time constraint has been substituted in the opportunity 
set. The right-hand side of the opportunity set represents the household full income and 
4In much of the developing world, many farmers grow crops for personal consumption instead of selling 
their agricultural output for a price that is thought to be a more profitable option. A conjecture to explain 
this choice is that one or several markets are missing. For instance, in developing countries there can 
be missing information about the profitability of crops, lack of access to capital, lack of infrastructure 
necessary to bring the crops to the market, and lack of human capital necessary to adopt succe.ssfully a 
new agricultural technology. On the other hand, in developed countries markets are well orgamzed and 
complete. 
5 Throughout the chapter we ignore corner solutions. 
it is made up of money-value of total time endowment, ~~f wiTi, nonlabour income and 
nonmaximized profits, pzzP- Wftf- Wmtm, generated by the household production. It is 
worth noticing that given the assumption of complete markets the household product can 
be sold on the marketplace or entirely consumed by the household and in general we have 
that zP-=/= zf + zm. 
The objective function Wh is modeled as the weighted sum of the utility function of 
the spouses with lit = J.L E [0, 1] and Jim= 1- J.L. The weight J.L represents the bargaining 
power that each member can exert on family resources. If J.L. = 1 the household welfare 
is entirely determined by the preferences of member f and it implies that she has total 
control over the household resources. On the other hand, if J.L = 0 the reverse is true, that 
is member m has full command on the household resources. For intermediate values of J.L, 
Wh embodies preferences of both members. Model (3.2) can represent both the unitary 
and the collective approach to household behaviour. When J.L is independent of budget 
constraint variables, program (3.2) represents a special case of the unitary model. On 
the other hand, in the collective model the weight J.L is in general a function of exogenous 
variables including variables entering the budget constraint, such as market prices, wages, 
nonlabour income and distribution factors. 6 When J.L is function of exogenous variables 
that enter the budget constraint the Slutsky matrix in general is not symmetric and it 
is made up of a symmetric matrix and a matrix with at most rank one (Browning and 
Chiappori 1998). 
The Lagrangian function corresponding to program (3.2) is 
.c f Jii Ui ( ci, zi, L i) + A. [ h ( tf, tm; B) - zP] + 
~=f 
(3.3) 
+<5 [-E WiTi + Y + PzZP- 'f Witi - f PiCi - Pz f Zi - f WiLil 
i=f i=f i=f i=f i=f 
6 Distribution factors are exogenous variables that can affect the household behaviour only through their 
impact on the decision process. In other words, the distribution factors do not affect either the individual 
preferences or the budget constraint. Examples of distribution factors used in empirical works are divorce 
ratio and sex ratio (Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix 2002), wealth at marriage (Thomas, Contreras, and 
Frankenberg 1997), and benefits (Rubacolva and Thomas 2000). In general, distribution factors simplify 
the theoretical identification of the partial derivatives of the sharing rule. In absence of distribution factors 
there needs to second order differential equations to recover the partial derivatives of the sharing rule. 
Given the usual curvature of preferences and a concave production function the following 
first-order conditions are both necessary and sufficient for an interior solution7 
and the budget constraint 
m. m. m. m m 
£8 = 0 ---+ .z= PiCt + Pz 2:::: zt + 2:::: WiLt = 2:::: WiTi + y + PzZP - 2:::: Witi' 
t=f i=f i=f i=f i=f 
which imply that the efficient conditions hold 
ui. Pz 
_L i=J,m, (3.4) 
ui. Pi c' 
Uli- Wi 
i= f,m, (3.5) Ui Pi c' 
uJ J.LjPJ 
____5;l_ i =f= j = J, m. (3.6) 
ui. J.LiPi c' 
At the equilibrium point, the individual's marginal rate of substitutions (3.4) and (3.5) 
are equal to the ratio between market prices. The marginal rate of substitution across 
the consumption of the two household members (3.6) depends on J.L and it determines the 
final location on the Pareto efficient frontier. 
The first-order necessary conditions of the production decisions are 
£ti 
8 
0 ~ hti (.) = A Wi i=J,m, (3.7) 
£zP 
A 
0 ~ Pz = 8 , (3.8) 
£;.. - 0 ~ zP = h(tf, tm). (3.9) 
7Throughout the chapter the notation Fx stands for the partial differential of function F with respect 
to the variable x. 
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In the case of tradeable domestic goods, equation (3.8) plays a crucial role: it states that at 
the optimum the ratio between the Lagrange multipliers associated with the opportunity 
set and technology constraints, respectively, is equal to the market price of the domestic 
good. Substituting this expression into equation (3.7) we obtain the efficient conditions 
for the production choice 
(3.10) 
and the family will produce zP up to the point where the value of ti 's marginal product is 
equal to its price. 
By equations (3.10) and (3.7), the factor inputs and optimal production of zP are 
obtained 
(3.11) 
(3.12) 
Note that the reduced demands of inputs and household production are functions only 
of Wf, Wm and Pz· This condition is sufficient to allow for separation between production 
and consumption decisions. Thus, optimal program (3.2) can be solved recursively in 
two stages. In the first stage, the family chooses the optimal level of input and output 
independently of individual consumption. Once these choices are made, the household 
decides its optimal consumption bundle that will be influenced by the production decisions 
through the budget constraint. The separation between production and consumption is a 
crucial property especially in empirical work. Exploiting the separation property, empirical 
estimation can be computed in two independent stages. First econometricians can estimate 
the production parameters and then those related to the consumption variables, avoiding 
in this way computational problems of jointness of household decision processes. Kote 
that the consumption-leisure variables are affected by the production side of the family 
through profit effects. 
10 
Substituting the optimal production solution into £ 8 , the budget constraint becomes 
(3.13) 
and along with the marginal rates of substitution yield the Marshallian demand functions 
for the household members 
fori= f, m with /1 = J.L (PJ,Pm,Pz, Wf, Wm, y). It is worth noticing that in equation (3.13) 
7r (Pz, Wf, Wm) = PzzP- ~~! w}} represents the optimal level of profits.s 
Up to this point, we have analyzed the production-consumption household behaviour 
within the collective model when markets are complete. The household makes its produc-
tion decisions independently of its consumption and leisure decisions. On the other hand, 
consumption-leisure decisions are not independent of production decisions. Consumption 
and leisure depend on market prices, income and the intra-household allocation of re-
sources J.L. Total household resources in turn are determined, to some extent, by profits 
from household's production activity. As a consequence, when making comparative static 
analyses the inclusion of the profit effect can change the direction and the magnitude of 
results predicted by models that account only for consumption and leisure. This evidence 
will be illustrated in Section 3.2.2. 
8 Potentially, profits can be positive, negative or equal to zero. However, in the long run, one can expect 
that if profits are negative a rational agent should shut down its production activity. This can be extended 
to economic activities run by households. A relationship between the sign of profits and returns to scale of 
production functions can be established when dealing with optimal profits derived by the optimization of 
a constrained program. In this case, economic theory states that with increasing returns to scale there is 
no solution to the profit-maximizing program. When the production function exhibits constant returns to 
scale one can distinguish three cases: 1) if marginal costs are greater than market price of the output then 
the optimal production level is zero, 2) if marginal costs are smaller then the market price of the output 
then no solution exists to the profit-maximizing program, and 3) when marginal costs are equal to the 
market price any non negative output level is a solution to the profit-maximizing program and generates 
zero profits. 
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3.2.1 The Separation Property: Profit-Maximizing Model and Individ-
ual Consumption-Leisure Choices 
Assumption 3.3 establishes a sufficient condition for the separability between production 
and consumption-leisure choices to hold and leads to the decentralization of program (3.2) 
in two distinct optimal programs. 
In the first stage, the household decides the optimal production plan by maximizing 
the following constrained program 
subject to zP = h(tf, tm). 
With strict concavity of h( ·) the first-order conditions are equal to 
w· hti(·) = -~, i = j,m, 
Pz 
(3.14) 
where this expression is equivalent to the first-order conditions produced by program (3.2), 
and the optimal solution is 
Substituting the last three equations into the objective function the optimal level of profits 
are derived 7f = 1r (pz, Wf, wm). The optimal profits can be interpreted as follows. If the 
domestic good is partially or totally sold on the outside market, 7r (pz, Wf, wm) measures 
the "objective" profits of the household. On the other hand, if zP is entirely consumed 
by the family, 1r (pz, Wf, wm) can be interpreted as the profit imputed to the domestic 
activities of the family. Note that the production variables do not depend on household 
preferences, and any exogenous change of the bargaining power J.L or the nonlabour income 
y does not affect the household production decisions. 
-·) ,_
In the second stage, according to an exogenous rule, the family decides how to share 
total economic resources between the household members 
where <p f = <p (p, w, Y) is the amount of household resources received by member f and 
'Pm = Y- <p (p, w, Y) by member m withY= y + 1r (pz, Wf, wm). For notational conve-
nience we have set p = (PJ,Pm,Pz) and w = (wf, wm). 
Given the sharing rule interpretation and exploiting the functional separability prop-
erty of wh' the household consumption program is equivalent to the following individual 
model. Each spouse independently chooses her optimal consumption-leisure bundle sub-
ject to her opportunity set. The individual model is given by 
max 
ci,zi,Li 
From the first-order condition we derive the reduced solution 
(3.15) 
where the sharing rule function 'Pi(·) is reported in reduced form and, as such, it is a 
function of exogenous variables. 
Under Assumption 3.3 and the additive functional form of Wh, program (3.2) can be 
split into two distinct optimal programs. One optimal program that accounts for household 
production decisions and the other for household consumption choices. Second, as a direct 
consequence of the Second Theorem of Welfare Economics in absence of public goodsg and 
externalities, the individual consumption program along with the sharing rule (3.15) lead 
to the same demands of the household program with the power index J.L defined over a set 
of exogenous variables. Note that the solutions produced by programs (3.14) and (3.15) 
must be equal to those borne by program (3.2). 
3.2.2 Comparative Static Analysis 
In this section we analyse the effects of wage, income on the optimal solution. By means 
of the separation property, production variables are not affected both by household tastes 
and the decision process f-L· It means that output and factor demands do not vary as 
market prices Pi, nonlabour income y and the decision process J.L change. Conversely, 
through the profit function that enters the budget constraint consumption-leisure choices 
are affected by changes that occur in the household production activities. In the appendix 
a formal derivation of the comparative static analysis presented here is drawn. 
Gross Substitution Effects Let us recall i 's leisure demand yielded by program 
(3.2) 
where 7f = 1r (pz, Wf, wm) is the optimal profit level and ji = J.L (PJ,Pm,Pz, Wf, Wm, y) is the 
Pareto weight. 
An uncompensated change of Wj on the optimal choice of i 's leisure has the following 
effect 
al) aLi aLi aJ.L aLi an 
-- = -- + ---- + ---- with i,j = J,m, 
awj awj ali awj an awj' 
9 Blundell, Chiappori, and Meghir (2005) extend the collective household model to pu_blic consumption. 
They show that the structure of the model can be identified by observing l~~our supplies an~ ho~sehold 
demand for public good. Identification of the individual welfare and the deciSIOn process reqmres either a 
separability assumption of the utility function or the presence of a distribution factor. 
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where Shephard's lemma g;. = -tJ 10 it follows that 
J 
with i,j = j, m. (3.16) 
For i = j we can suppose, ceteris paribus, that a positive change in her market wage 
makes her consumption of leisure more expensive. Thereby, if leisure is a normal good, 
it is likely that she will substitute away from leisure and towards paid jobs, either zi or 
ti, but the model cannot predict which of the two paid activities she will choose. Thus 
the first term on the right-hand side of equation (3.16), g~:, is negative. Accounting for 
household production another effect arises. A change in Wi will change the optimal value 
of the profit function. An increase in Wi will make the input ti more expensive, profits will 
decrease and the household opportunity set will decrease as well by the amount of tJ ~~i . 
Moreover, as her market wage changes, it is plausible to expect a variation in the Pareto 
weight. However, how J.L should be affected by a change in Wi depends on the interpretation 
that one may give to the intra-household allocation process. A first interpretation would 
point up the "redistribution" purpose of the Pareto weight. Following this view, transfers 
of household resources turn out to compensate inequalities in paid incomes within the 
household (Chiappori 1992). In that case, given an increase in wi, member i will be better 
off and thus reduces the need for a transfer of household income in her favour. Therefore, 
relying on this interpretation, it is plausible that g;:;i is negative and, if it is the case, the 
overall sign of equation (3.16) is negative. 
A second interpretation, on the other hand, would emphasize the bargaining nature 
10 The maximum value of the profit function is 
differentiating let say with respect to Wf 
{)1i; = Pz ( {)!: atf + 8_h {){"') - w f ()tf - tf - W-m at= ' 
aw1 atf WJ at= w1 WJ WJ 
and combining terms yields 
{)1i; = (Pz {)!: - W f) ()tf + (Pz {)_!: - W-m) at= - tJ • 
aw 1 at! w 1 at= w 1 
I ·1·b · p 8h w· - 0 for i - f m thus a1r = -tf Note that the profit change is the same n equ11 num z &ti - t - - ' ' aw1 · 
whether or not inputs are held fixed or whether they in principle can vary as the market wage changes. 
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of f-l· In that case, an increase in Wi would lead to an increase of i command on the 
household resources and g:;;i would be positive. In this case, the overall sign of equation 
(3.16) depends on which of the three effects, the substitution effect, the profit or the 
bargaining effect, overwhelms the other. Similar gross substitution effects can be drawn 
for the purchased good and the home-produced good. 
Net Substitution Effects Using the optimal demand ofleisure, we analyse a change 
of the market wage Wj compensated by a change of the nonlabour income y such that the 
household welfare does not vary. The Slutsky equation is also performed for the domestic 
good. 
The compensated effect on i's leisure equation is 
(3.17) 
with i,j = f,m where LildWh=O is the compensated demand function. Equation (3.17) is 
the collective generalized Slutsky equation extended to a production-consumption house-
hold model. The first two terms compose the conventional substitution matrix, which is 
symmetric and negative semidefinite. In general ~ti [ ::j - (TJ- V -tJ) ~ J , the term 
yielded by the Pareto weight, is not symmetric and has at most rank one (Browning and 
Chiappori 1998). 
The introduction of household production does not make much difference in terms of 
comparative static analysis. In particular, since household members allocate their time 
to market and domestic jobs the income effect is as conventionally weighted by i 's labour 
supply, but accounting for domestic time the number of working hours is net of leisure time. 
As a consequence, for i = j assuming that leisure is a normal good makes a backward-
bending labour supply curve less likely than if agents were solely supplier to the labour 
market. When her wage increases, she begins to substitute away from the good becoming 
relatively more expensive, thus it is likely that g~: is negative. However, the wage change 
also changes her opportunity set and her bargaining power within her family. Note that 
in the unitary setting the latter effect does not appear. Assuming that leisure is a normal 
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good then the income effect is positive, hence ~~i and ~ are both positive. The size of 
the income effect is determined by j 's labour supply Tj -I) - tj, and considering internal 
solutions, it is strictly positive. Hence, second and fourth term are both positive. As 
mentioned above, the sign of g;:;i depends on the interpretation that one might give to f-L· 
In the case of complete markets, the own-price effect of the domestic good is equal to 
The first term on the right-hand side of the equation is the substitution effect and is 
negative. Since the domestic good is assumed to be a normal good, ~i and ?Jft are both 
positive. Consequently, the sign and size of the income effect depends on whether the 
family is a net seller or a net buyer. When the family is a net seller, zP - zi > 0, the 
second and last term are positive. On the other hand, when the family is a net buyer, 
zP - zi < 0, they change the sign. 
In the following sections we study the case of absent markets of domestic goods. We 
study the conditions assuring separability between production and consumption decisions 
with missing markets. In addition, we introduce joint production function and discuss the 
implications of jointness on the structure of the collective household model. 
3.3 Nonmarketable Domestic Goods, Constant Returns to 
Scale and Joint Production 
Let us relax Assumption 3.3 and suppose that zi is nonmarketable with i = f, m. Two 
implications arise. Firstly, there is no exogenous market price for zi and thus each family 
has its own implicit price. Secondly, the home-made good is entirely consumed by the 
family, whereas in the case of complete markets the domestic good can be sold on the 
market. 
I I 
The household maximizes the following problem 
(3.18) 
tf,tm 
m . m . m m 
and I: PiCt + I: wiLt = I: wi1i + y - I: witi, 
i=f i=f i=f i=f 
with Li > 0, zi > 0, ti > 0 for i = j, m. Program (3.18) is basically similar to (3.2). The 
substantial differences lie in the composition of the budget constraint and in the production 
technology. In equation (3.1) the value of the household product appears both on the 
left-hand side, as expenditure, and on the right-hand side, as revenue. Moreover, on the 
right-hand side of equation (3.1) the last three terms added together formed the household 
profits derived by selling zP. Differently, in the budget constraint of program (3.18) the 
cost of producing the domestic good appears, L:~f Witi, implying that when markets 
are missing the household behaves as it were a cost minimizer. Finally, the production 
function exhibits joint technology: by means of the same factors the household produces 
two different domestic goods privately consumed by each members. Joint production is 
an assumption that we will maintain also in the following section. Interpretation of the 
objective function is similar to the verbal interpretation given to problem (3.2). 
The Lagrangian function associated with (3.18) is 
.C = _E JiiUi(ci, zi, Li) +A [h(tf, tm)- z!- zm] 
t=f 
+ <5 [.f WiTi + y- E Witi - ~ PiCi - ~ WiLi] ' 
t=f t=f t-f t-f 
and it produces the following first order conditions 
(3.19) 
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ui. A. 1 ____£_ i=f,m, (3.20) Ui 8 Pi ' c' 
UJ -
___Q!_ J.LjPj i =f- j = j, m, (3.21) ui. -
c' J.LiPi 
8 
hti (·) = -wi i=f,m, (3.22) A. 
plus the technology and budget constraints. 
The marginal rates of substitution within and across the consumption of the two 
members, (3.19) and (3.21) respectively, and the marginal product (3.22) are similar to the 
case of marketable domestic good. Equation (3.20) says that in equilibrium the individual 
marginal utility between the domestic and market good is equal to the ratio of ~-the 
relation between the Lagrange multipliers associated with the consumption and production 
constraint-to the market price of ci. In Section 3.2 we find that in equilibrium the first-
order conditions yield that ~ equals the exogenous price of zP. 
Taking the ratio between the marginal products of tf and tm, we derive the usual 
efficient condition for the production activities 
htf(tf, tm) _ Wf 
htrn ( tf, tm) Wm ' 
where this expressiOn says that in equilibrium the ratio of wages equals the ratio of 
marginal products of the two factors. Solving this expression for ti and substituting it 
back into the production function the optimal quantity for the domestic time is derived 
It represents the factor demand curve when outputs are held constant. Isolating the last 
term on the right-hand side of the budget constraint we obtain 
(3.23) 
that specifies the minimum total cost of producing any given level of output. It is assumed 
to be monotonically increasing in ZJ and Zm and the prices of the inputs, w1 and Wm. 
To solve the set of first-order conditions related to the household consumption~ 
introduce the following assumption on the household technology. 
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Assumption 3.4 (Constant Returns to Scale) Let us assume that the household pro-
duction function is homogenous of degree one. 11 
Then it follows that 
Proposition 3.1 When markets of the domestic goods are missing given Assumption 3.4 
the implicit price p; of the domestic good is not affected by tastes and the decision process 
1-L of the household. 
Proof. A crucial implication of technologies with constant returns to scale is that the 
corresponding minimum cost is a function linear in the output, that is 
(3.24) 
In equilibrium we define the implicit price p; of the domestic good as the marginal cost of 
producing the domestic good 
that given equation (3.24) it becomes 
• 
This result is a crucial sufficient condition for the separation property to hold when 
markets of the domestic goods are absent. Another feature of this result is that the 
11 A function J(x) is said to be homogeneous of degree kif f(tx) = tk f(x) for all values of x and for any 
positive t. In words, homogeneity means that if all the arguments of the function are multiplied by the 
same positive constant t then the value of the function ends up to be tk times its old value. If a functio~ is 
homogeneous of degree one, then doubling all its arguments doubles the value of the function. If a functwn 
is homogeneous of degree zero, then as long as all arguments change by the same percentage the value of 
the function will remain constant. 
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implicit price p; is the same for both household members. This follows from assuming 
production technologies of the form zf + zm = h( tf, tm). By standard economic theory. in 
equilibrium marginal costs are equal to the Lagrange multiplier-this result is illustrated 
in the following remark-12 and * in equation (3.20) can be opportunely replaced with 
Pz (wj,Wm). 
Remark 1 (Linear Homogeneity) Linear homogeneity of h( ·) implies that the mini-
mum cost C (wf, Wm, Zf, zm) can be written as a combination of wages and output linear 
in z = ZJ + Zm, that is Pz (wf, wm) z. From standard economic theory we know that the 
marginal cost function equals the Lagrangian multiplier. In our setting the ratio of the 
Lagrangian multipliers associated with the production and the budget constraints, 
80 (wj, Wm, Zj, Zm) 
8zi 
thus exploiting Assumption 3.4 it follows that 
.X 
8' 
(3.25) 
A formal derivation of (3.25) can be obtained as a simple application of the envelope 
theorem. First, from the optimal program {3.18) the cost minimization problem can be 
written as 
where the Lagrangian multiplier * is obtained dividing the two terms by 8. The minimum 
cost is 
differentiating C partially with respect to zi 
80 8tf (wj, Wm, z) 8tm (Wj, Wm, z) 
-8 .=Wj 8i +wm 8i ' z~ z z 
(3.26) 
12The remark is a simple application of standard economic theory (see for example Silberberg 1990). 
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from the first-order relations 
i=f,m, 
substituting these values into equation {3.26) yields 
(3.27) 
By the constraint 
and with optimal factor demands it must hold as an identity 
Hence, we can differentiate this identity with respect to zi 
1- 8h(tf, tm) atm (wf, ~m, z) - 8h(tf, tm) atm (wf, ~m, z) 0 
8tf az~ atm OZ1 ' 
and 
oh(tf, tm) otm (wJ, Wm, z) oh(tf, tm) Otm (wJ, Wm, z) _ 
otf [)zi + atm [)zi = 1 
thus in equation {3.27) the terms in parentheses equal one and, therefore, at the equilibrium 
the marginal cost equals the Lagrangian multiplier 
oC (WJ, Wm, ZJ, Zm) A 
[)zi 8. 
Now, substituting Pz (wf,wm) into (3.20) yields 
i= f,m, (3.28) 
that is the marginal rate of substitution between the domestic good and the market good 
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equals the ratio of the implicit domestic price Pz ( w f, wm) over the market price. Finally, 
by means of equations (3.19), (3.21), (3.28) and along with the budget constraint 
m m m m 
2::: WiTi + Y- p; 2::: Zi - 2::: PiCi - 2::: wiLi = 0, 
i=f i=f i=f i=f 
(3.29) 
where the minimum cost function C(wf,Wm,ZJ,Zm) = p;L::z:;,1 zi has been substituted 
into the linear budget constraint, we obtain the optimal solution of the consumption 
choices 
i = f,m 
i = j,m 
i=f,m. 
To summarize, in this section we show that production and consumption choices are 
separable even when markets for the domestic good are missing. In the case of missing 
markets for the separation property to hold a sufficient condition is that household tech-
nology exhibits constant returns to scale. At the equilibrium point the implicit price of the 
domestic good p; equals the marginal cost. Given constant returns to scale the total cost 
function is linear in the output quantity and thus the implicit price p; of the domestic good 
does not depend on household preferences and the decision process J.L· The implication 
is that input factor demands do not depend on household preferences and on J.L and the 
household program can be solved recursively in two stages as in the case of well-organized 
markets. In the first stage, the household will decide the optimal time devoted to the 
production activities, then it will decide the optimal consumption of the market goods, 
leisure and domestic goods. 
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3.3.1 The Separation Property: Cost-Minimizing Model and Individual 
Consumption-Leisure Choices 
Under Assumption 3.4, the implicit price of the domestic good depends on inputs' prices, 
WJ and Wm, and on the production technology but not on household preferences. As a 
consequence, even though markets are missing, household production choices are still sep-
arable from the consumption decisions. Differently from the case of marketable domestic 
goods, here the family has a cost minimizing behaviour. This evidence appears from the 
budget constraint of program (3.18). Thereby, in the first stage, the household decides 
the input factor demands by solving the following constrained program 
subject to ZJ + Zm = h(tf, tm), 
and from the first-order conditions yield the optimal factor inputs 
substituting these two equations into the objective function we derive the minimum cost 
function C = ~:! Witi (wJ, Wm, ZJ, Zm) = p; ~:! Zi. 
In the second stage, similar to the case of marketable domestic good, the household 
consumption variables are the solution of the following maximizing program 
max litUf(cf,zf,Lf) +JimUm(cm,zm,Lm) 
cf ,zf ,Lf ,ern ,zrn ,Lrn 
(3.30) 
subject to 
m m . m . m 
~pici +p; ~ z2 + ~ wiL2 = ~ WiTi +y, 
i=f i=f i=f i=f 
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with first-order conditions equal to 
Uli Wi 
ui. Pi c• 
i= f,m, 
u~i p; 
ui. Pi c• 
i=f,m, 
uJ J-l·Pj c) __ J_ 
ui. J-liPi c• 
i -/=j = J,m, 
that together with the budget constraint produce the optimal solution of the consumption-
leisure bundle 
fori= f,m. 
Then, according to the second theorem of welfare economics, given an appropriate 
allocation of household resources, the Pareto-efficient household model (3.30) can be de-
centralized into two individual consumption programs. Spouses agree on an unspecified 
rule to allocate nonlabour income and then each spouse solves the following problem 
max 
ci,zi,Li 
where p; = Pz (wf, wm) and 'Pi is the sharing rule function with 'PJ + 'Pm = y. Notice 
that in the case of marketable domestic goods household members decide the allocation 
among them of nonlabour income and optimal profit levels. Thus the sharing rule satisfy 
'Pt + 'Pm = y + 1r (pz,Wf,Wm). Conversely, in a model with minimization of costs the 
8.j 
sharing rule represents the intra-household allocation of nonlabour income only. 
For the consumption-leisure choice the efficient necessary conditions are 
and substituting back into the budget constraint we get the set of reduced optimal equa-
tions 
that are equal to the optimal solution obtained solving program (3.30). 
3.3.2 Comparative Static Analysis 
Similar to Section 3.2.2, we perform gross and net substitution effects for the individual 
demands of leisure and domestic good derived from program (3.18). In Section 3.2.2 we 
show that changes of market wages or of the output price Pz affect household consumption 
directly through conventional substitution effects and indirectly through profit effects. 
When markets are missing, on the other hand, variations of market wages lead to variation 
of household consumption directly through substitution effects and indirectly through 
changes of the implicit price p;. 
Gross Substitution Effects Recall i's leisure demand produced by program (3.18) 
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where p; = Pz (w1, wm), an uncompensated change of Wj gives rise to the following effects 
(3.31) 
A change of Wj affect i 's leisure demand through three channels: 1) a direct effect 
gt;, 2) a change of the Pareto weight ~ti %!;j, and 3) a change of the implicit price of 
the domestic good aLi &Pz The first two effects are equal to those derived under the &pi OWj. 
assumption of marketable domestic goods and the interpretation of them is similar to that 
given to equation (3.16). However, the variation of i's market wage affects also the implicit 
price of the output. Precisely, 
assuming that the factor tJ is normal, an increase in output increases the demand for tJ 
and the overall gross substitution effect depends on which of the three effects overwhelm 
the others. It is worth remarking that in equation (3.16) the profit effect is negative 
while in equation (3.31) changes of the implicit price due to changes of j's wage has a 
positive impact on i's leisure demand. This difference may lead to not comparable gross 
substitution effects between the household collective models. 
Net Substitution Effects The collective generalized Slutsky equation for the indi-
vidual demand of leisure is 
and for the domestic good is 
In the appendix we give a formal derivation of the Slutsky conditions. The Slutsky con-
ditions derived under the assumptions of complete markets and of missing markets with 
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constant returns to scale are equal. This result is a direct consequence of separability, that 
is preserved even with missing markets, and duality that establishes equality bet\Yeen the 
absolute value of the profit effects t;. and the effect produced by market wage variations 
J 
on the implicit price g~z. We thus refer readers to the comments reported in Section 3.2.2. 
J 
3.4 Nonmarketable Domestic Goods, Nonconstant Returns 
to Scale and Joint Production 
In this section, we study the case of nonmarketable domestic goods with nonconstant 
returns to scale household technologies. The structure of the household model is as the 
one described in (3.18) with the following assumption. 
Assumption 3.5 (Nonconstant Returns to Scale) Let us assume that the household 
production function exhibits nonconstant returns to scale. 
It follows that 
Proposition 3.2 VVhen markets of the domestic goods are missing given Assumption 3. 5 
the implicit price p; of the domestic good is affected by tastes and by the decision process 
of the household. 
Proof. The minimum cost function to produce a given quantity of z is equal to 
where the minimum cost function is nonlinear in Zi fori= f, m. The implicit price of the 
domestic good is then equal to 
where in general 8~~~i depends both on ZJ and Zm. As a consequence, P~* depends on 
household preferences and the decision process J.L as well as on technology and prices of 
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market goods.13 • 
Note that differently from Proposition 3.1, the implicit price P;* is not the same for 
the two household members. 
When the implicit price of the domestic good depends on household preferences the fol-
lowing problems occur. Firstly, since production decisions depend also on the consumption 
patterns of the household, recursive models cannot be employed to represent the household 
behaviour. This is a severe limitation especially for econometric applications. Recursivity 
is very important for applied works since it makes the problem far more tractable. Sec-
ondly, given nonconstant returns to scale the minimum cost function is nonlinear in the 
output and along with joint production the budget constraint is nonlinear in z as well. The 
nonlinearity degree depends on the household technology and the functional form chosen 
for the production function. This means that the production-consumption model may 
not have an analytical-closed form solution. 14 Lastly, nonseparability of production and 
consumption decisions together with the assumption that both household members devote 
time to the domestic production produce that the sharing rule model cannot be employed 
and the household model cannot be decentralized into two single optimal programs. 
Alternative Production-Consumption Household Models 
In order to overcome the last two mentioned problems, in the remainder of this section, 
we propose two alternative specifications of the production function. In both approaches 
joint ness of the production function is excluded but the assumption of nonconstant returns 
to scale is maintained. In particular, in the first alternative we assume that the household 
produces z! and zm by means of two distinct technologies. In each production function 
inputs are time allocated by both the household members. Abstracting from jointness 
allows to find a unique closed-form solution to the household program. However, the 
production and consumption decisions must be solved jointly and due to the specification of 
13 Generalizing to the case of homothetic production functions the minimum cost function can be written 
as 
C ( W f, Wm, Z f, Zm) = Pz ( W f, Wm) F (z f, Zm) 
and the implicit price of the domestic good is independent of the output only if the function F (zJ, .:::m) is 
homogenous of degree one implying a constant returns to scale production function. 
14 Within the context of a consumption technology model, Pollak and Wachter (1975) get similar findings. 
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the production functions the sharing rule model cannot be employed. Since both household 
members devote a part of their time to the production of the domestic good priYately 
consumed only by one member, we will refer to this technology specification as a model 
with "caring" production functions. 
In the second alternative we assume that each household member produces by her-
self the domestic product that she privately consumes. This specification of the produc-
tion function provides a framework for applying the sharing rule model. However, the 
production-consumption decisions are taken jointly by each household member. We will 
refer to this household framework as a model with "separate" production functions. 
A. No joint production and "caring" production functions 
Without joint production and nonconstant returns to scale, it is possible to derive the 
household demands for consumption and leisure by specifying particular production tech-
nologies. The implicit prices, however, depend on household tastes and as well as on 
the decision process J-L implying that the production-consumption decision must be solved 
jointly. 
Formally, household's production technologies are represented by 
where the individual time constraint is now equal to 
and according to this identity, individual i allocates her time to the following four activities: 
leisure, Li, labour market, zi, production of zf, ti, and of zm, Ti. 
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The household thus solves the following production-consumption program 
(3.32) 
m.m .m m m 
and L PiCt + L wiL2 = L wiTi + y- L witi- L WiTi, 
i=f i=f i=f i=f i=f 
where the individual time constraint has been opportunely substituted into the household 
opportunity set. Interpretation of program (3.32) is similar to comments given to the 
previous two household models. 
The Lagrangian function corresponding to program (3.32) is 
where the production functions have been substituted into the corresponding utility func-
tions. 
For an interior solution, the conventional standard efficient conditions for consumption 
and production variables are 
i= j,m, 
that along with the budget constraint yield the household demand functions and inputs 
which we denote by ci(PJ,Pm, Wf, Wm, y, Ji), zi(PJ,Pm, Wf, Wm, y, Ji), Li(PJ,Pm, Wj, Wm, y, Ji), 
ti (pj,Pm, Wj, Wm, y, Ji) and Ti(PJ,Pm, Wj, Wm, y, Ji) fori= J, m. 
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The household production-consumption model (3.32) represents a solution to the im-
possibility of finding a closed-form solution when production functions exhibit simultane-
ously jointness and nonconstant returns to scale. Given the particular form of the produc-
tion functions, however, the production-consumption model cannot be decentralized into 
two individual model and the sharing rule approach cannot be employed. 
B. No joint production and "separate" production functions 
In the previous section, we suggest that in the presence of nonconstant returns to scale 
to find a closed-form solution, joint production should be omitted. In this section, we 
propose household technologies without joint production that are suitable for applying 
the sharing rule approach. 
Formally, household's production technologies are represented by 
where, accordingly, each household member provides by herself the production of the 
domestic good that she privately consumes. 
The household then solves the following production-consumption model 
max Wh = p,1uf (cf, z!, Lf) + flmUm (em, zm,Lm), 
cf ,zf ,Lf ,c= ,z= ,£=, 
(3.33) 
tf ,t= 
m m m m . 
and 2: PiCi + 2: WiLi = 2: WiJi + Y- 2: Wit\ 
i=f i=f i=f i=f 
where the individual time constraint has been opportunely substituted into the household 
opportunity set. 
The Lagrangian function corresponding to (3.33) is 
where 9i ( zi) is the inverse function of the production function, that is ti = gi ( z i) . The 
equilibrium conditions for an interior solution are 
Uli Wi 
i= J,m, (3.34) ui. Pi ct 
ui. Wi9izi ____£_ i= f,m, (3.35) 
ui. Pi ct 
together with the budget constraint. Equation (3.34) represents the efficiency condition 
in the consumption allocation. Equation (3.35) shows that the marginal rate of substi-
tution between the domestic and the market good is equal to the marginal value prod-
uct divided by the market price. The solution for the household demand functions and 
inputs are ci(PJ,Pm, Wf, Wm, y, /i), zi(PJ,Pm, Wj, Wm, y, /i), Li(PJ,Pm, Wf, Wm, y, /i), where 
ti (PJ,Pm, Wf, Wm, y, /i) is obtained by substituting zi (·) into 9i(zi). 
The advantage is that, given an appropriate exogenous sharing rule, model (3.33) can 
be decentralized into the following individual model 
max Ui( ci, zi, Li) 
ci ,zi ,Li ,ti 
for i = J, m. The usual efficient conditions for an interior solution are 
i= J,m, 
i=J,m, 
with optimal solution given by ci(Pi, Wi, 'Pi), zi(Pi, Wi, 'Pi), Li(Pi, Wi, 'Pi), ti(pi, Wi, 'Pi) with 
'Pi= 'Pi (PJ,Pm, w1, wm, y). As mentioned in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, the solution of program 
(3.33) must be equal to that produced by the sharing rule model. It is worth highlight-
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ing that given Assumption 3.5 separability between production and consumption-leisure 
decisions fails to apply. 
3.4.1 Comparative Static Analysis 
In this section we perform gross and net substitution effects for the individual demands of 
leisure derived by program (3.32) and discuss the differences that nonseparability makes 
to comparative static analysis. The qualitative analysis is carried out by means of the 
notion of implicit prices (Strauss 1986). 
Gross Substitution Effects i's demand of leisure can be written as 
where P1* = P1 (wJ,Wm,zi (PJ,Pm,Wf,Wm,YJi,)) is the implicit price of the domestic 
good privately consumed by member i. Different from model (3.18), given nonconstant 
returns to scale, P1* depends on the optimal output produced and consumed by member 
i. Therefore, the implicit price of the domestic good Pi* is, in turn, function of market 
prices, wages, nonlabour income and the household decision process J),. 
The gross substitution effect of i's leisure demand is equal to 
The first part of this equation is similar to equations (3.16) and (3.31): in the context of 
a collective model the wage effect can be decomposed into a Marshallian response, g~·, 
J 
and a collective effect, ~i ;;:;j, which derived from variations of the Pareto weight. Terms 
in parenthesis derive from the endogeneity of the implicit price P~*. As market wages 
vary the implicit price presents a direct change ~~~ and an indirect change produced by 
J 
. . ) ()pi {)tJ d . th ti . al a variation of z~. As shown in Sectwn (3.3.2 , ifu: = ozJ an assummg at Is norm 
J 
this effect is positive. With nonconstant returns to scale, gross substitution effects become 
ambiguous and interpretation of these effects is strongly based on a number of assumptions 
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that make it difficult to predict the sign of changes of Wj. 
Net Substitution Effiects Under th t' f e assump Ion o nonconstant returns to scale 
and nonseparability of production and consumption-leisure decisions, the collective Slutsky 
equation is 
where zi = Tj -I) - ti - Tj is j's labour supply. The compensated effect is composed 
by the conventional collective Slutsky equation and by changes of the implicit price P;*. 
According to Browning and Chiappori (1998), the collective Slutsky matrix is the sum of 
a symmetric and negative semidefinite matrix and a rank one matrix. The implicit price 
P~* has three effects on the collective demand for leisure. First, it has a direct wage effect 
~~~ that, as previously discussed, is positive. Second, variations of the implicit price P;* 
J 
due to variations of market wages produce an indirect wage effect ~~f ( g~: + ~~ %/Jj) . 
g~i· is negative thus the sign of the wage effect depends crucially on the interpretation 
J 
that we give to %/J .. Third, variations of the implicit price P~* due to variations of mar-
J 
ket wages produce an income effect zi ~~f ( aa: + ~~ ~) . We conclude that with missing 
markets and nonconstant returns to scale the Slutsky symmetry and sing conditions are 
not unambiguously interpretable. 
3. 5 Conclusions 
The production-consumption household model presented in the chapter is general under 
two points of view. The household is seen as a "family-enterprise" producing goods by 
transforming factor inputs. The factor inputs are time devoted by each family member 
to the household production. Moreover, consumption decisions of household members 
are taken in consideration. Thus, the household model describes the family as involved 
both in production and in consumption decisions. The household model can embrace 
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both urban and rural families in relation to the location of both the household and the 
entrepreneurial activity. When business activity owned by the family is not undertaken, 
then the household sells labour either to the job market or to the household. In this case, 
the general model of a "family-firm" reduces to a "family" engaged in domestic production. 
The "family-firm" model is a general equilibrium model in miniature where the household 
enterprise fully reproduces at the micro level the characteristics of a macro society. 
The production-consumption household model is also general in the sense that the 
household is represented as a collection of individuals (Apps and Rees 1988, 1997, and 
Chiappori 1988, 1992, 1997). Different from the unitary approach, that considers the 
household as the basic decision unit with a joint preference structure, collective models 
describe the household as a group of individuals each of whom is characterized by spe-
cific preferences. Agents, interacting within a collective decision process, agree on a rule 
that governs the intra-household allocation of total nonlabour income. The sharing rule 
function is not directly observable but can be deduced from the available information on 
private consumption of exclusive or assignable goods ( Chiappori 1988, 1992). The collec-
tive approach makes no assumption about the rule that governs the allocation of resources 
within household members. It only requires that household outcomes are Pareto efficient. 
As a consequence, decision process takes place as if it were a two-stage budgeting process. 
In the first stage, the household decides how to share combined household resources among 
each individual. It follows that each member, while choosing the most preferred utility 
maximizing bundle of goods and leisure, faces an individual budget constraint. Assuming 
consumption of private goods only, this approach permits to recover up to a constant both 
private consumption and individual welfare functions (Chiappori 1992). 
From an empirical perspective, findings of this chapter highlight that: 1) in the 
case of complete markets the separation property of production and consumption-leisure 
holds hence econometricians can first estimate production equations and then separately 
' 
consumption-leisure demands. This substantially eases the estimation process; 2) in the 
case of incomplete markets, the separation property may fail to hold. To preserve the 
latter the econometrician has to assume constant returns to scale and then can estimate 
' 
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in two stages the household decisions. When constant returns to scale are not assumed 
the econometrician has to estimate jointly the household production and consumption 
decisions. 
We study the production-consumption household model under the assumptions of com-
plete and absent markets of the domestic good. This analysis, however, can be extended 
to absence of other markets, for instance absence of labour markets. We focus on the sepa-
ration property between production and consumption choices and emphasize the relevance 
of production and consumption household behaviour both for developing countries, where 
most households are engaged in agricultural activities, and for developed countries, where 
families can run business or agricultural activities and/ or household members devote a 
part of their own time to domestic activities. In addition, it is important to account for 
production-consumption household behaviour when analysing policy intervention in the 
rural economy. Agricultural policies will affect not only production but also consumption 
and labour supply of the family members. 
Under the assumption of marketable domestic goods, the separation property holds and 
the production-consumption household model within a collective context can be solved re-
cursively in two stages. In the first stage, the family is engaged in maximizing a profit 
function independently of its consumption and leisure decisions. Once this choice is made, 
the family decides the optimal consumption-leisure bundle. The consumption-leisure vari-
ables are affected by the production decision through the maximized profits that enter the 
budget constraint. 
We then relax the assumption of complete markets. As a consequence, domestic prices 
are endogenous to each family and we study which restrictions must be assumed to preserve 
the separability between production and consumption decisions. Specifically, we show that 
with missing markets a sufficient condition for the separability to hold is the assumption of 
constant returns to scale of the household production technology. With constant returns 
to scale, the minimum cost function to produce a given quantity of z depends linearly 
on output and consequently the implicit price of the domestic good does not depend on 
household tastes and the decision process. This assures that the production-consumption 
97 
household model can be solved recursively. Different from the complete market case, when 
making production choices the family behaves as it were a cost minimizer. 
Lastly, we deal with the case of missing markets of the domestic good under the 
assumption of nonconstant returns to scale. Within this setting and joint production, the 
minimum cost function to produce a given quantity of z depends nonlinearly on output 
and in addition the implicit price of the domestic good is a function of household tastes 
and the decision process. As a consequence, the production-consumption household model 
must be solved jointly. Moreover, due to joint technologies a closed-form solution to the 
production-consumption household model cannot be found. In order to overcome this 
drawback, we propose two alternative specifications of the production function. 
An alternative assumes that the household has two distinct technologies to produce 
the domestic good consumed privately by the two household members. Without joint 
technologies the household program has a unique closed-form solution. However, the pro-
duction and consumption decisions must be solved jointly and due to the specification of 
the production functions the sharing rule model cannot be employed. A second specifica-
tion of the production function that we propose is a viable way to apply the sharing rule 
model. We assume that each household member produces by herself the domestic product 
that she privately consumes. However, the production-consumption decisions are taken 
jointly by each household member. 
The collective models of production-consumption household behaviour developed un-
der different market structures are enlarged with a qualitative analysis. In particular, we 
extend the generalized collective Slutsky equation to incorporate the production choices of 
the family both with marketable and nonmarketable domestic goods. Either with complete 
markets for the domestic good or missing markets and constant returns to scale produc-
tion functions, the introduction of household production does not make much difference in 
terms of comparative static analysis. The collective Slutsky conditions satisfy the S:\Rl 
property (Browning and Chiappori 1998). This property states that the collective Slutsky 
matrix is made of a symmetric, negative semidefinite matrix and a rank one matrix. The 
rank one matrix originates from the shift of the Pareto weight due to changes of prices 
9S 
and nonlabour income. On the other hand, with absence of markets for the domestic 
good and production functions with nonconstant returns to scale the comparatiYe static 
analysis fails to predict unambiguously the sign and symmetry of the Slutsky matrix. 
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Appendix: Comparative Static Properties 
In this appendix we formally derive the Slutsky equation of the collective demands for 
leisure and domestic goods of the three household models presented in the chapter. As 
usual, the following results hold at the equilibrium point only. 
The Case of Marketable Domestic Goods 
Let us recall the second stage of the household consumption program when markets are 
assumed to be complete 
W h ~ ut ( f f £f) + ~ urn ( m m Lm) max = J.L f c , z , f-Lm c , z , , 
cf ,zf ,Lf ,em ,zm ,Lm 
(A.l) 
m m m m 
subject to I: PiCi + Pz I: zi + I: WiLi = I: WiTi + Y + 7r (pz, Wf, Wm), 
i=f i=f i=f i=f 
with optimal solution equal to 
(A.2) 
(A.3) 
(A.4) 
bargaining index. 
Let dw · indicate an infinitesimal change in the j's market wage and let it be compen-
J 
sated by a variation in the nonlabour income dy. Hence, using equation (A.3) the following 
expression is derived 
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Totally differentiating the budget constraint yields 
m . m . m 
~ Pidct + ~ ctdpi + Pz ~ dzi 
i=f i=f i=f 
m . m m 
+ ~ ztdpz + ~ WidLi + ~ Lidwi, 
i=f i=f i=f 
and solving for dy we obtain 
m . m . m . m . m . 
+ ~ Pidct + ~ ctdpi + Pz ~ dzt + ~ ztdpz + ~ WidL\ 
i=f i=f i=f i=f i=f 
where by Shephard's lemma we have that 8
8n = zP and 8
8n. = -ti. Pz w, 
As in Browning and Chiappori (1998), the comparative statics is performed keeping 
both the household utility function and the Pareto weight constant; in this way, while 
the budget constraint is rotating due to simultaneously changes in wage and income, the 
household, as a whole, remains on its original indifference curve. See Browning, Chiappori, 
and Weiss (2006) for a geometric representation of the substitution and income effects of 
the collective model. The total differential of the household welfare is 
m m . ~ Jii (U~idci + u;idzi + UlidLi) + ~ Uid/? = 0, 
i=f i=f 
(A.6) 
and using the first-order conditions, JiiU~i = 8pi, 7iu;i = 8pzJiU1i = 8wi together with 
the assumption that dJii = 0 for i = j, m, equation (A.6) becomes 
(A.7) 
Given equation (A.7), the total differential of the budget constraint turns out to be 
dy =- 'f (7i- Li- ti) dwi - zPdpz + 'f cidpi + 'f zidpz. (A.8) 
i=f i=f i=f 
We are studying the effect of a compensated change of Wj only, thus expression (A.8) is 
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equal to 
Finally, substituting the expression of dy into equation (A.5) the compensated wage effect 
equals 
Let us now turn on the own-price effect of the domestic good. From (A.4) we have 
(A.9) 
and (A.8) is 
substituting then this equation into (A.9) the own-price effect results in 
where 871' = zP. Bpz 
The Case of Nonmarketable Domestic Goods: Constant Returns to Scale 
Let us recall the second stage of the household consumption program when markets are 
absent and the production function exhibits constant returns to scale 
m m m 
subject to 2: PiCi + 2: WiLi = 2: WiTi + y- C (wj, Wmi ZJ, Zm), 
i=f i=f i=f 
where C = C (wf, wm; Zf, Zm) is the minimum cost function faced by the family to produce 
the optimal amount of ZJ and Zm totally consumed by the family. The optimal solution 
1()2 
bears by the program are 
Lt (PJ,Pm, Wf,Wm,Y) 
Now, the comparative statics analysis in this section proceeds in like manner the case of 
marketable domestic goods. Therefore, the compensated wage effect on the demand of 
leisure is 
To find the expression for dy, then we totally differentiate the budget constraint 
Since we are holding both the household utility function and the bargaining index constant 
the total differential of the household welfare function, 
m . . . . . . . m . . 
2::: /2 (U~;dct + u;;dzt + Ul;dLt) + 2::: Utd/2 = 0, 
~~ i=f 
becomes 
where we have opportunely substituted the first-order conditions, /iiU~; = Opi, /iiU~; 
oCzi, /iiUli = OWi, and that dfii = 0 fori= j, m. Substituting the last expression in the 
total differential of the budget constraint we have 
where the identity g~ = ti has been opportunely substituted. Eventually, the compen-
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sated wage effect is 
Let us turn on the own-price effect on the domestic good and use the same arguments as 
above we have 
(A.l2) 
the total differential of the budget constraint becomes 
then replacing the value of dy in equation (A.l2) we have 
The Case of Nonmarketable Domestic Goods: Nonconstant Returns to Scale 
Let us recall i's collective demandfor leisure of program (3.32) 
good privately consumed by i. 
On f} (PJ,Pm,Pz, Wf, Wm, y) a change of j's market wage yields the following effects 
(A.l3) 
and a change of the nonlabour income y has the following effects 
(.-\.1-1) 
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Substituting equations (A.13) and (A.14) into the conventional Slutsky equation, g!;;. -
J 
zj 88ti, we obtain the collective Slutsky equation 
where zj = Tj - I) - tj - Tj is j 's labour supply. 
Chapter 4 
A Dynamic Model of Consumption 
and Discrete Fertility Choices 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a finite-horizon dynamic model of fertility and consumption within 
a certain environment. Fertility is modelled as a discrete choice and it is the outcome of 
comparisons between parents' welfare level with and without an extra child. 
Especially in advanced societies, where contraceptive methods are easily available at 
a relatively low price and nowadays are generally accepted as common practices of birth 
control (Goldin and Katz 2002), spouses can schedule the number, timing and spacing of 
births over their reproductive life and the fertility behaviour can be modelled as an endoge-
nous variable. However, the fertility choice is also affected by socioeconomic circumstances 
specific to each household, such as parents' income, level of education, altruism and the 
costs of children, and by environmental circumstances faced by families living in the same 
country in a given period of time, such as child care services available at a relative low price, 
availability of part-time jobs, flexibility of the labour market, tax system and in general 
family policies that provide financial support to households with dependent children. 
Since Becker's pioneering application of economic analysis to various aspects of hu-
man behaviour, a number of works have studied the interrelation between socioeconomic 
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variables and the fertility decision. Becker himself (1960) classifies children with durable 
goods, such as cars or houses, and shows that the theory of the demand for durable goods 
is a useful set-up in analysing the demand for children and in understanding the effect of 
family income on fertility. 
In the context of the theory of consumer behaviour, Willis (1973) presents a static 
model of lifetime fertility. Couples obtain their utility by the maximization of a household 
welfare function whose arguments are home-produced commodities, quantity and quality 
of children. The level of utility that the household can achieve depends on its budget con-
straint and technologies to produce the consumed commodities and quantity and quality 
of children. 
Michael (1973) analyses the mechanisms through which couples' education affects their 
fertility behaviour. He assumes that households derive their utility from consumption of 
home-produced commodities, and the number and quality of children. The household 
produces both the commodities and children according to a production function in which 
inputs are purchased market goods and parents' time. In this framework, parents' level 
of education might influence their fertility choice by affecting tastes, wealth, the produc-
tion function and/or the value of time of each parent. Investments in education raise the 
potential earnings of the spouses and in turn might affect the relative prices of bearing 
and rearing children, influencing the demand for children. It is especially the increase in 
the market wage of the wife that negatively influences the demand for children. More-
over, Michael (1973) recognizes that the parents' education can determine the quality and 
quantity of children. He argues that more-educated couples can be particularly productive 
in enhancing human capital in their children and education can lower the relative cost of 
fertility control and more-educated couples would choose contraceptive methods which on 
the average are more effective in preventing pregnancy. 
Becker and Barro (1988) study the implications of parents' altruism toward children on 
their fertility choice. Altruism is modelled using a dynastic utility function that depends 
on the consumption, fertility and the number of descendants in all generations. \Yithin 
this context, fertility is an endogenous variable to each household and the household 
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budget constraint includes the interest rate, among other variables such as wage rate, 
costs of raising children and bequest. The condition of utility maximization related to the 
parents' fertility choice requires the marginal benefit of an additional child to be equal to 
the marginal cost of producing that child. As a consequence, the first order conditions 
to maximize utility imply that fertility in any generation depends positively on the real 
interest rate. They also find that fertility responds to variations in the degree of altruism: 
if the cost of rearing children is constant over time, fertility depends positively on interest 
rates and on the degree of altruism. 
A number of works study how policy intervention affects the fertility decision. In par-
ticular, it is studied the effects that tax systems and child subsidies produce on the demand 
for children. It is widely recognized that welfare policies that provide financial support 
to families with children positively affect the fertility choice of the families. Studying the 
inverse relationship between female labour participation and fertility rates, Apps and Rees 
(2004) show that countries which have individual rather than joint taxation, and which 
support families through child care facilities rather than child payments, are likely to have 
both higher female labour supply and higher fertility. Comparing the evolution of com-
pleted fertility patterns between Swedish women and women in neighbouring countries, 
Bjorklund (2006) finds that the extension of Sweden's family policy aiming at reducing the 
costs of children has raised the level of fertility and has shortened the spacing of births. 
However, Bjorklund (2006) finds that a generous family policy is not able to change the 
negative relationship between wive's education level and fertility. 
In developing countries, that are characterized by missing markets and absence of pen-
sion schemes, the reproductive behaviour of families is also affected by insurance motives. 
Parents consider their offspring as a form of investment against risks of income insuffi-
ciency in old age or in other economic adverse circumstances, such as unemployment or 
illness (Cain 1983). 
The purpose of the chapter is to explore fertility outcomes as a discrete choice in a 
life-cycle context. The dynamic analysis of fertility choices emphasizes the effects exerted 
on the family size decision by the costs of rearing children. The dynamic model is devel-
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oped under a set of simplifying assumptions designed to obtain an analytical solution to 
the dynamic program. In particular, we assume that the instantaneous utility function 
of parents is of the CARA form and, neglecting that spouses can have different fertil-
ity preferences, we abstract from bargaining processes that can occur within the couple. 
Furthermore, we assume that parents face perfectly foreseen costs of rearing children and 
these costs are equal across children. Within this framework, we show that in each period 
of the reproductive life the couple does not have a child if the pure utility gain from not 
having a child is greater than the utility saving in cost from having the child. However, 
the model has neither implications for quality of children nor for wife's participation to 
the labour force. 
We then carry out a simulation exercise of the dynamic model. The fertility outcome 
is analysed for traditional and non-traditional couples. The former is a family in which 
there is only one main wage earner. On the other hand, the non-traditional family is 
characterized by the presence of two wage earners. In this way, we are able to control 
for different fertility outcomes due to different costs of rearing children faced by the two 
families. As expected, the traditional couple decides to have more children relative to the 
non-traditional couple. In particular, the traditional family has two children with a two 
year gap between the first and second birth. On the other hand, the non-traditional couple 
has just one child. The consumption pattern and assets accumulation of the two families 
are influenced by different fertility outcomes. Given a bigger family size, throughout the 
reproductive life consumption pattern of the traditional family is in general higher relative 
to consumption of the non-traditional family. To provide sustainable consumption through 
the reproductive life, both the families get heavily into debt. 
The dynamic household model of fertility choice developed in this chapter is similar 
to that of Wolpin (1984). Studying the connection between child mortality and fertility 
within a dynamic stochastic model, Wolpin (1984) treats the fertility choice as a discrete 
endogenous variable. However, Wolpin (1984) aims at estimating the dynamic fertility 
model and he does not give an analytical representation of the optimal fertility choice 
rule. The estimation proposed by Wolpin (1984) is based on integrating the numerical 
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solution of the model with a maximum likelihood procedure. 
The contribution of the chapter is twofold. First, using a dynamic model \W explore 
fertility outcomes as a discrete choice in a life-cycle context. Hence, fertility is modelled 
as a discrete choice and it is the outcome of comparisons between parents' welfare level 
with and without an extra child. To our knowledge, from a theoretical perspective this 
approach has been applied to various family decisions but not to fertility choices. 
Second, the chapter develops a simulation exercise of the dynamic fertility model. 
In particular, the fertility outcome is analysed for traditional and non-traditional couples. 
The former is a family in which there is only one main wage earner. On the other hand, the 
non-traditional family is characterized by the presence of two wage earners. In doing so, 
we control for different fertility outcomes due to different costs of rearing children faced by 
the two families. Results of the simulation are as expected: the traditional couple decides 
to have more children relative to the non-traditional couple. In particular, the traditional 
family has two children with a two year gap between the first and second birth. On the 
other hand, the non-traditional couple has just one child. Moreover, different family sizes 
impact on the consumption pattern and assets accumulation differently. Given a bigger 
family size, throughout the reproductive life consumption pattern of the traditional family 
is in general higher relative to consumption of the non-traditional family and to provide 
sustainable consumption through the reproductive life the traditional family gets heavily 
into debt. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we lay out the dy-
namic model of fertility choice and consumption. In Section 4.3 we present the simulation 
analysis of the dynamic model differentiating fertility outcomes by family types. Section 
4.4 draws conclusions. 
4.2 A Life-Cycle Model of Fertility and Consumption 
We consider the parents' decision of consumption and fertility over their life-cycle. They 
marry at time J, have a reproductive life that lasts up to F and die at T with T > F.1 
1 Without loss of generality we assume that births occur within married couples. 
110 
The fertility choice is made sequentially. At the beginning of period t E [!, F] the couple 
decides whether to have a child, and in t + 1 decides whether to have an additional child, 
and so on up to F. We abstract from the likelihood of either multiple births or child 
mortality and the variation in the number of children t:ltn can assume only two discrete 
values: t:l.tn = 0 if the couple does not have an additional child, t:ltn = 1 if the couple 
has the additional child. A period t is defined to be that length of time within which a 
single birth may occur. Contraception is assumed to be perfect during reproductiYe life 
and once spouses decide to have a child the birth occurs with certainty. 
We assume that the couple has intertemporally separable preferences defined over a 
finite horizon and preferences depend on a single composite consumption good Ct and the 
number of children nt 
T 
W = LPtU (ct,nt), 
t=f 
where p > 0 is the rate of time preference. The parents' instantaneous felicity function is 
represented by a CARA utility function2 
(4.1) 
with Tft = f (nt) equals 1 whenever nt = 0 and TJi < 0, and f3 > 0 is the coefficient of 
absolute risk aversion. We assume that the number of children nt interacts multiplicatively 
with consumption and hence the consumption and the fertility choices are not separable 
implying that the marginal utility of Ct is affected by the number of children of the family. 
The stock of household assets evolves from one period to the next according to 
(4.2) 
where we assume that there are no liquidity constraints, and the couple should die with 
2 We think of the family as if it were a unique decision maker and therefore we model family behaviour 
using a unitary framework. However, we recognize the relevance of using alternative approaches to model 
family fertility behaviour. For instance, Rasul (2007) develops and tests a model of household bargaining 
over fertility where parents have different preferences toward children. He finds that if couples bargain with 
commitment, fertility outcome representes both spouses' fertility choice. On the other hand, if couples 
bargain without commitment, the effect of each spouse's preference on fertility outcomes depends on the 
threat point in marital bargaining and the distribution of bargaining power. 
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no wealth and no debt, therefore Ar+l = 0. Household nonlabour income At is measured 
at the beginning of time t. For the sake of simplicity, the interest rate r is assumed to 
be constant through time. In each period of time parents face perfectly foreseen costs of 
rearing a child3 P and they are assumed to be equal for all the children.-! 
The law of motion for the stock of children nt is 
nt = nt-1 + f::.tn, t = f + 1, ... , F, (4.3) 
where l::.tn can take two values 0 or 1, 
nt = np, for t = F + 1, ... , T, 
and with initial condition 
(4.4) 
that is spouses start marriage with no children. 
As described in the remainder of this section, the household maximization problem 
given by (4.1)-(4.4) is solved using the principle of optimality (Bellman 1957). The solution 
is obtained by backward recursion. At the start of each period of timet the discrete fertility 
choice is the result of comparisons between parents' utility levels with and without a birth. 
4.2.1 The Value Function 
Let introduce the definition of the variables of choice and parameters that enter the utility 
function and the opportunity set: 
P = denotes the per period costs of rearing a child faced by the couple; these costs are 
perfectly foreseen by spouses; 
r = denotes the interest rate and is assumed to be constant through time; 
p = denotes the rate of time preference or discount factor with p > 0; 
(3 = denotes the coefficient of absolute risk aversion with (3 > 0; 
3 Note that real costs of rearing children fall due to the interest rate r. 
4 In Section 4.3 we give a definition of the costs of rearing children and, in addition, we give information 
on how in principle these costs can be estimated. 
Ct = denotes household consumption measured at the end of each period of time t; 
nt = denotes the number of children measured at the end of each period of time t: 
Yt = denotes household labour income measured at the end of each period of time t: 
11:? 
At = denotes household nonlabour income measured at the beginning of each period of 
timet. 
We conjecture that at the beginning of period t the value function V (At) is of the 
same functional form as the utility function (Merton 1971, Berloffa and Simmons 2003) 
(4.5) 
where At, Nt and 8t are functions to be determined. 
Optimal Consumption and the Value Function in the Last Period of the Couple's Lifetime 
In the last period of life T, the reproductive life has ended and the couple does not decide 
whether to have a child. All the financial assets are consumed by the family thus Ar+l = 0 
and the optimal consumption rule is simply equal to 
cr = (1 + r) Ar + YT- Pnp, 
where the stock of children np is constant and equal to the number of children born 
between f and F. The instantaneous utility function is obtained by replacing the optimal 
consumption cr in the instantaneous utility function 
1 - 77 F exp [-(3 ( ( 1 + r) Ar + YT - Pn F)] , 
and the value function, measured at the start of the period, is 
V (Ar) - 1- T}p exp ( -f3cr) + pV (Ar+l), (4.6) 
with TJF = J(np ). Using the fact that Ar+l = 0 and substituting the optimal consumption 
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into ( 4.6) we can establish that 
A.r- Nr exp ( -f35rAr)- 1- 'T]p exp [-(3 ((1 + r) Ar + Yr- Pnp )] 
from which we get the solution for the unknowns A.t, bt and Nt 
A.r 1, 
by (1 + r), 
Nr 'T]p exp ( -(3 (Yr- Pnp )) . 
Optimal Consumption and the Value Function in Periods t E (F, T) 
At the beginning of period t E (F, T), when the reproductive life of the couple has ended, 
the couple solves the following optimal program 
max V (At) = 1- 'T]p exp ( -f3ct) + pV (At+l) 
Ct,At+l 
(4.7) 
subject to At+l + Ct + Pnp = (1 + r) At+ Yt· 
To solve the optimal problem we substitute V (At+l) along with the budget constraint 
into ( 4. 7) thus 
max V (At)= 1-'T]p exp ( -f3ct)+p {>..t+l- Nt+l exp [-f35t+l ((1 + r) At+ Yt- ct- Pnp )]} , 
Ct 
taking then the first-order condition with respect to Ct and opportunely re-arranging we 
find the optimal policy for the household consumption fortE (F, T) 
1 
( 
Nt+1 )1+"t+l [ 6t+1 )] exp ( -f3ct) = pbt+l-- exp -(3 5 ((1 + r) At+ Yt- Pnp , 'T]p 1 + t+l 
(4.8) 
and the instantaneous utility function u ( Ct, nt) is 
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Now we check the conjecture that V (At) arg maxct 1- 'TJF exp ( -f3ct) + pV (At+
1
) 
(4.9) 
From equation ( 4.8) we can derive the expression for exp (/36't+1 ct) 
( 
Nt+l) - 1!t.;~:l [ 6';+1 l 
exp (f36't+lct) = pbt+l--:ry;- exp {3
1 
+ bt+l ((1 + r) At+ Yt- Pnp) . (4.10) 
Substituting ( 4.8) and ( 4.10) into ( 4.9) yields 
1 
1 ( Pbt+lNt+l) 1+8t+l [ /36't+l ((1 + ) A + - 'TJ F exp - 1 £ r t Yt 
'TJF + Ut+l 
-Pnp )] + PAt+l- pNt+1 exp [-/36't+l ((1 + r) At+ Yt- Pnp )] 
and re-arranging terms we have established our conjecture ( 4.5) 
(4.11) 
with the following recurrence relations 
bt+l bt = 6' (1 + r) , 
1 + t+l 
and 
and so forth up to the period T - F. In order to explain how the backward recursion 
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method works, in the Appendix we solve this system of equations for the periods T- 1 
and T- 2. 
4.2.2 The Fertility Choice Rule 
At the beginning of period T - F, that is the last period of time in which the couple can 
decide whether to have a child or not, the couple solves the following program 
max V (Ar-F) 
cr-F,nr-F,AT-F+1 
1- 'rJT-F exp ( -f3cr-F) + 
pV ((1 + r)Ar-F + YT-F- cr-F- Pnr-F), 
subject to the household asset constraint. Substituting the expression of V (AT-F+d, we 
obtain 
max V(Ar-F) 1 - 'rJT-F exp ( -f3cr-F) + p { AT-F+l- Nr-F+l 
cr-F,nr-F 
exp [-f38T-F+l ((1 + r)Ar-F + YT-F- cr-F- Pnr-F )]} · 
Taking the first-order condition with respect to cr-F, we find the optimal path for the 
consumption 
1 
exp (-f3cr-F) ( 
Nr-F+l) 1+"r-F+1 p8r-F+l __ _ 
'rJT-F 
exp [-{3 8T-F+l ((1 + r) Ar-F + YT-F- Pnr-F )] ' 
1 + 8r-F+l 
and the value of the optimal utility function is 
1 
( 
Nr-F+l) 1+"r-F+1 
1- 'rJT-F p8T-F+l __ _ 
'rJT-F 
exp [-{3 8T-F+l ((1 + r) Ar-F + YT-F- Pnr-F )] ' 
1 + 8r-F+l 
( 4.12) 
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from which we can expand derivation of the fertility rule as 
. [ 0 (N~-F+1) 1+8r~F+1 ( (38T-F+1 (YT-F- Pn~-F)) mm TfT-F o exp -
TfT-F 1 + 8T-F+1 ' (4.13) 
1 (Nf-F+1) 
1+8r~F+1 ( (38T-F+1 (YT-F -Pn}_p))] TfT-F 1 exp - , TfT-F 1 + 8T-F+1 
where the superscript 0 stands for the couple's decision "not to have a child'' and 1 .. to 
have a child." Putting equations (4.12) and (4.13) back into the value function we have 
that 
AT-F - Nr-F exp ( -f38r-FAT-F) -
( 
8T-F+1 (1 + r) ) 1 + 8T-F+1 1 8 1 - 1 + PAT-F+1 - exp -(3 
1 8 
Ar-F 8 (p8T-F+1) + T-F+l + T-F+1 T-F+1 
. [ 0 (N~-F+1 ) 1+"r~F+1 ( (38T-F+1 (YT-F - Pn~-F)) 
mm TfT- F o exp - 1 + 8 ' TfT-F T-F+1 
(
N,1 _ ) 1+8r~F+1 ( 8r-F+1 (YT-F - Pn}_p))] 
711 T F+1 exp -(3 , 
'IT-F 711 1 + 8T-F+1 
'IT-F 
and equating coefficients we solve the unknowns AT-F, 8r-F and Nr-F 
AT-F 
8r-F 
Nr-F 
1 + PAT-F+1, 
(38T-F+1 (1 + r) 
1 + 8r-F+1 ' 
1 + 8T-F+1 ( K ) 1+8r~F+1 
K PUT-F+1 
UT-F+1 
[ (
No ) 1+8r~F+1 ( 8r-F+1 (YT-F - Pn~-F)) . o T-F+1 exp (3 ' 
mm TfT-F o - 1 + 8r-F+1 TfT-F 
(
N,1 ) 1+8r~F+1 ( 8r-F+1 (YT-F- Pn}_p) )] 
TJt-F ;1-F+
1 
exp -(3 1 + 8r-F+1 . 
T-F 
ll/ 
In order to explicitly write the optimal fertility choice, let us write 
(-!.1-!) 
and 
Dr_p(o) f (nF-1) exp ( -(3Gp (8) Pnp_I) Kp(YT-F+1, ... , Yr), 
f (nF-1 + 1)Dr-F(<5) exp ( -(3Gp (8) P(nF-1 + 1)) Kp(YT-F+1, ... , Yr), 
where Kp (·) captures the evolution of the labour income Yt from T- F toT, Gp (8) and 
Dr-F (8).summarise the evolution of 8 through time Substituting the expression N¥-F+l 
into Nf-F+1 we get 
[
j( + 1)]Dr-F(8) 
Nf-F+1 = N~-F+1 ;(n-;_
1
) exp (-(3Gp (8) P). (4.15) 
Re-arranging equation ( 4.13) the optimal fertility choice corresponds to 
min (77~-F) (N¥-F+1) 1+8r-F+l exp (f3b.Pn~-F) exp ( -f3b.YT-F), [ 
~ 1 
~ 1 l ( 'TJ}_p) (Nf-F+1) 1HT-F+l exp (f3b.Pn}_p) exp ( -f3b.YT-F) , 
where b. = 8T-F+l replacing equations ( 4.14) and ( 4.15) and n~-F = nF-1 and n}_p = 
1+8r-F+1' 
( 
1 ) Dr-F(8) ) 1+cir~F+l 
((! (n - + 1))~ No- (f (nr-F-1 + ) exp ( -(3Gp (8) P) F 1 T F+1 j (nT-F-1) 
exp ((3b.P(nF-1 + 1)) exp ( -f3b.YT-F )] , 
lb 
cancelling out common terms, we obtain 
(! (nF-1))~ > (f (nF-1 + 1))~ 
[ (f (nF-1 + 1) / f (nF-1) )Dr-F(t5) exp ( -,BG F (8) P) J l+Or~F+1 . 
Re-arranging terms 
and solving for the child function f (np_1 ) 
(4.16) 
In each period of time t < F equation ( 4.16) can be generalized as 
1 
( 4.17) 
Equation ( 4.17) describes the optimal fertility rule for each t E [j, F]: the couple does not 
have another child in t if the pure utility gain from not having a child f (nt-l) is greater 
1 
than the utility saving in cost from having the child, f (·) [exp ( -,BGt ( 8) P)] ctH +(1Ht+1)Dt(8l; 
otherwise the couple finds it optimal to have an additional child. 
In each period of the reproductive life the choice "whether to have an additional child 
or not" is based upon the costs of rearing children P faced by couples. Fertility choices 
are also influenced by the coefficient of absolute risk aversion ,B. In particular, we observe 
that as the costs of rearing children P increase it is likely that the birth does not occur. 
Similarly, if ,B increases. 
The interest rate r indirectly affects the fertility choice through 8. According to the 
recurrence equations, 8 is increasing in the interest rate. Therefore, as the interest rate 
raises, ceteris paribus, the last term on the right-hand side of equation ( 4.17) increases rais-
ing in this way the costs of having an additional child and hence reducing the probability 
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of having a new birth. 
4.2.3 The Optimal Consumption Rule 
Taking the logarithm of equation ( 4.8) and solving for Ct we obtain the optimal consump-
tion policy in each t 
__ ln (pot+l) 1 (Nt+l) ot+l 
Ct- f3 (1 + Dt+l) - f3 (1 + Dt+d ln --:ry;- + 1 + Dt+l ((1 + r) At+ Yt- Pnt)' (4.18) 
with 'TJt = TJ F and nt = n F for t E ( F, T] . In the last period of the couple lifetime T, the 
optimal consumption function is 
cr = ( 1 + r) Ar + YT - Pn F. 
As usual with CARA preferences, optimal consumption ( 4.18) depends positively and 
linearly on current disposable resources net of the costs of rearing children, (1 + r) At+ 
Yt- Pnt. Another feature of optimal consumption derived by CARA preferences is that 
Ct may be negative. 5 In our model the probability of negative consumption increases since 
household wealth available for consumption is reduced by the costs of rearing children. 
During the reproductive life, the couple's decision of having a child in each t E [f, F]leads 
to a discrete shift in Nt±l and it increases the total costs of rearing children Pnt faced by 
'Tit 
the couple. Therefore, it is likely that optimal consumption will fall due to the extra costs 
related to the presence of children. As the number of dependent children increases, ceteris 
paribus, there are less resources available for family consumption other than expenditures 
for children and ct decreases. A similar effect would occur if the costs of rearing children 
P raise. 
The intercept of the optimal consumption Ct is composed of time preference effect 
ln (pot+1) and the effect of future fertility choice ln ( N~-; 1 ). The time preference effect 
5 A feature of optimal consumption derived by CARA preferences is that consumption may be negative. 
One can find conditions on exogenous variables under which optimal consumption is positive in all t 
(Berloffa and Simmons 2003). On the other hand, one may impose the restriction on the optimization 
that consumption must be positive in any date. However, in doing so the tractability of the model could 
be lost and one must beware of the possibility that the model can produce absurd predictions. 
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FIGURE 4.1: Labour Income Profiles Over the Life Cycle by Traditional and Xon-
Traditional Families 
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ln (pb"t+l) is negative thus the first term in equation (4.18) increases consumption. It is 
more difficult to predict the sign of the effect of future fertility choices Ntt 1 on optimal 
Tlt 
consumption. If N~-; 1 > 1 future fertility choices hold down current consumption. In this 
way, couples depress current consumption to face the future costs of new births. The 
interest rate r affects consumption through different ways. It positively affects nonlabour 
income At. Moreover, as previously mentioned, 5 is a function increasing in r. Thus, 
the interest rate r raises the slope 1!6;~1 of the optimal consumption and increases the 
coefficient of future fertility choice. 
4.3 A Simulation Exercise: Fertility Choices of Traditional 
and Non-Traditional Couples 
This section describes the model's simulation. The simulation is carried out for t\Yo stylised 
scenarios. In particular, we consider the fertility choice of traditional and non-traditional 
couples. According to Apps and Rees (2001), the traditional couple is a family in which 
1:21 
there is one main wage earner, in general the husband. On the other hand, in the non-
traditional couple both spouses works. In this way, we attempt to model different family 
size patterns that occur since families with different labour market participations face 
different opportunity costs of children. Thus we expect families with higher opportunity 
costs of children, in the simulation the non-traditional couple, will have fewer children. 
We suppose that spouses marry at twenty-eight years old, reproductive life lasts up to 
forty and, thus, fertility choices are simulated for a period of twelve years. 
In order to mimic earnings over couples' life cycle, labour incomes Yt are designed 
to have a bell-shaped profile according to the following equation (Berloffa and Simmons 
2003) 
Yt = 1 + 0.05 exp( (- (t- 20) /20) 2 ) + 0.05Et with Et rv U(O, 1). 
To differentiate labour incomes by family types we assume that the intercept 1 takes 
a value of 6.5 for the traditional couple and of 8.5 for the non-traditional couple. In 
addition, in order to capture wage fluctuations due to economic trends of labour markets, 
we allow the labour income profile to slightly vary through time according to a noise term 
Et uniformly distributed. In simulating the labour income profile Yt we attempt to reduce 
heterogeneity between the two families. We thus assume that adult members of the two 
families are employees, with similar levels of education, and the non-traditional family 
gets higher wage incomes only because there are two wage income recipients. 
In Figure 4.1 the labour income profile Yt is depicted by traditional and non-traditional 
family. Over the life cycle, labour incomes are designed to be always higher for the non-
traditional couple, since there are two wage earners, they get the maximum at t = 20 then 
labour incomes start to decrease. 
The interest rate is held constant at r = 0.025, the discount factor is p = 1/1.15 and 
the coefficient of absolute risk aversion is (3 = 1.63.6 Initial assets At are equal to 3. These 
figures are held constant across the two families. As illustrated in the remainder of the 
section, the costs of rearing a child together with the level of labour incomes \·ary across 
traditional and non-traditional families. We also present the fertility choice simulation 
6 The value of these terms is based on Berloffa and Simmons (2003). 
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FIGURE 4.2: Costs of Rearing a Child Over the Life Cycle by Traditional and :\on-
Traditional Families 
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assuming r = 0 but maintaining the value of the other parameters unchanged. 
The presence of children radically changes the organization of the family. Dependent 
children affect the expenditure patterns of a family. Parents substitute away adult good 
expenditures for children good expenditures (Deaton, Ruiz-Castillo, and Thomas 1989). 
Empirical evidence shows that there exists a positive correlation between family size and 
the budget share of food expenditure. As the family size increases, ceteris paribus, the 
budget share for food expenditures increases. Parents' allocation of time is also affected by 
children. Especially in the first years of children's life when they need supervision, women 
devote a good deal of their time to look after children. In order to do that, women often 
decide either to work part-time or to cease from work. Children influence also the demand 
for housing, portfolio and migration decisions. However, for these household decisions 
there is not systematic evidence of how children affect them. Since household outcomes 
are significantly affected by the presence of children, economists devote a good deal of 
their research agenda to study the effect of children on household behaviour and, from an 
empirical perspective, how to model the effect of children on household demands (Barten 
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FIGURE 4.3: Number of Children and Birth Spacing Over the Repr d t' . 1 .c b 
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1964, Gorman 1976, Lew bel 1985, Pollak and Wales 1981). 
According to Browning (1992), the presence of children raises some questions.'~ An 
issue examined by Browning (1992), related to our purpose of defining the costs of rearing 
a child, is the expenditure question, that is how much parents spend on their children. 
How much a family spends for children defines the costs of rearing a child and, to some 
extent, it explains fertility outcomes. 
We define the costs of rearing a child as follows. 
Definition 4.1 (Costs of rearing children) The costs of rearing a child P is a june-
tion, increasing in all its terms, 
of the costs of maintenance a child CM, the costs of non-necessary goods consumed only 
by children C£ and the cost of adult time devoted to look after children Cf. 
The costs of maintenance a child C M refer to another issue raised by Browning ( 1992). 
Precisely, children arise "the needs question: how much incomes does a family with chil-
dren need compared to a childless family?" (Browning 1992:1440). Equivalence scales 
answer the needs question and, therefore, we propose to estimate the costs of mainte-
nance by means of them. Equivalence scales are used to make welfare comparison between 
7 Browning (1992) arises four questions associated with the presence of children in the family. However, 
here we report only the issues related to our analysis. 
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FIGURE 4.4: Consumption Patterns Over the Reproductive Life by Traditional and ::\on-
Traditional Families 
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FIGURE 4.5: Asset Accumulations Over the Reproductive Life by Traditional and Non-
Traditional Families 
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families with different demographic characteristics and to serve this objective they mu~t 
satisfy the property of income independency (Blackorby and Donaldson 1991, Blundell 
and Lewbel 1991). As a consequence, the costs of maintenance account only for necessity 
good expenditures and as such eM is independent of family current disposable income. 
For the purpose of the simulation, we set eM = 2.88 and it does not vary across the two 
family types. As for labour income profiles, to reflect price variations through time we 
modify the costs of maintenance adding a random effect uniformly distributed. 
There exists a negative correlation between the presence of children and female labour 
supply. This evidence shows that in general the opportunity costs of children ef are borne 
by the wife that decides to work part-time or to cease from work when there are young 
children in the family. If this is the case, family current disposable income decreases and 
the presence of children may lead to negative effects on family consumption of adults. 
To estimate the value of time devoted by parents to child care one can choose between 
the opportunity costs and the market cost approach (Fitzgerald, Swenson, and Wicks 
1996, Harvey 1996). The former approach values the time allocated to domestic activities 
using the wage that individuals earn in the labour place. An empirical issue arises when 
individuals do not work since we cannot observe their market wages. On the other hand, 
the market cost approach measures the value of domestic goods and services using the 
market price that one would pay to buy the good in the outside market. Underlying 
the market cost approach is the idea that domestic and market goods are each other 
substitutes. 
Finally, the costs of rearing a child P account for the costs of non-necessary goods 
consumed only by children e£. As the opportunity costs of children, these costs depend 
on family current disposable income. In principle, it is straightforward to measure e£: 
it suffices to survey "who gets what" in the household. However, there are very few 
household surveys that record item expenditures at the individual level. In absence of 
such data to infer the costs of non-necessary goods consumed only by children we need 
to use indirect methods. An indirect method is to regress household expenditures on 
8 This choice is based on a recent estimation of equivalence scales for Italy (Menon and Perali 200i). 
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children (Douthitt and Fedyk 1990). Another set of methods for 1'dent1'fy· d' mg expen 1tures 
on children when we observe only household expenditure is to use information on adult 
goods (Deaton, Ruiz-Castillo, and Thomas 1989). Lazear and Michael (1988) propose an 
interesting approach. Their idea consists in identifying total expenditure on adults and 
from this we can find the expenditure on children by subtraction. 
In the simulation, in each t the costs of non-necessary goods consumed only by children 
Cf and the opportunity costs Cf are simulated by imputing the 30 per cent of current 
labour income Yt for the traditional couple and the 40 per cent of current labour income 
Yt for the non-traditional couple. The costs of rearing a child9 are illustrated in Figure 
4.2. Over the life cycle, by construction, the non-traditional couple faces higher costs of 
rearing a child than the traditional couple. 
As expected, the non-traditional couple ends its reproductive life with fewer children 
than the traditional couple (Figure 4.3). In particular, fertility patterns of the two families 
show that the traditional couple has two children with two year gap between the first and 
the second child. On the other hand, the non-traditional couple has only one child. Both 
families has the first child in the second year of marriage. 
In Figure 4.4 consumption patterns are reported by family types. In the periods of 
time in which the two families has equal family size, consumption of the non-traditional 
family is higher relative to consumption of the traditional family. Consumption of the 
traditional family suddenly jumps when the second child is born, this effect is produced 
by the discrete shift of the intercept, and then throughout the reproductive life it remains 
higher than consumption of the non-traditional family. However, consumption patterns of 
the two families are depressed by the costs of rearing children. As a result, consumption 
of both the families decreases during the reproductive life. The non-traditional couple has 
smoother consumption patterns than the traditional couple. After five years of marriage 
the two families get into debts. However, the non-traditional family registers less negatiYe 
9 The costs of rearing a child P has been calculated as P = CM + Cf + Cf. In particular, in ea~h t 
for the traditional family the costs of rearing a child is given by P = (2.8 + Et) + 0.30 · Yt, where Et IS a 
noise uniformly distributed and 0.30 · Yt summarises the costs ~f non-ne~essary goods cons~~ed only ~.\: 
children, Cf, and the cost of adult time devoted to look after ch1ldren, Cr. For the non-tradltwnal farml) 
the costs of rearing a child becomes P = (2.8 + Et) + 0.40 · Yt· 
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FIGURE 4. 7: Consumption Patterns and Assets Accumulations Over the Reproductive 
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assets accumulation, hence it has more wealth, due to higher labour income profile and a 
smaller family size relative to the traditional couple. 
To illustrate how the interest rate may influence parents' fertility choices we run the 
simulation assuming that the interest rate is equal to zero r = 0. As stated in Section 
4.2.2, the interest rate r affects fertility choices through b. In particular, as the interest 
rate decreases, all the other things being equal, the costs of having a child decreases as 
well increasing, in this way, the probability of a new birth. This effect is depicted in Figure 
4.6. Both families have one more child with respect to the previous scenario. \Ioreover. 
setting the interest rate equal to zero has the effect of reducing the spacing of births. 
Figure 4. 7 provides a graphical presentation of the consumption pattern and assets 
accumulation of the two families assuming r = 0. The left-hand panel shows the simulated 
consumption pattern for the two family types: when the size of the hm families increa:-;e:-.: 
12" 
consumption increases as well and then starts to decrease. The right-hand panel shm•::--
the assets accumulation of the two families. Similar to Figure 4 5 th t f ·1· h .. . e wo am11es aYe 
negative assets accumulations but with r = 0 the difference 1·n assets 1 · f h accumu atlon o t e 
two families is reduced. 
We have also simulated fertility and consumption choices assuming p < r. Since on 
fertility and consumption choices the coefficient of absolute risk aversion has the same effect 
of the interest rate, we have obtained similar results to the scenario with the interest rate 
equal to zero. 
4.4 Conclusions 
Given the relevance of the human reproductive behaviour, a number of researchers from 
various scientific disciplines have devoted attention in understanding it. The fertility be-
haviour has raised the attention of economists because of its unexpected trends. r-.Ialthus 
argued that with increasing income people would marry earlier and therefore had more 
children. Moreover, an increase in income would reduce child mortality and, as a conse-
quence, countries getting richer would experience a population growth. 
Contrary to Malthus' view, since the late 1960s the fertility rate has registered a drastic 
decline in almost all the industrialized countries. The fertility decline has been accompa-
nied by a sharp change in the structure of the reproductive behaviour of households. In the 
last decades couples have decided to postpone births affecting also the spacing of births. 
In general, with the increase of average age at first marriage, couples tend to reduce the 
spacing between subsequent births. 
Family size outcomes are affected by a number of variables. The number of children is 
the result of sharing a family project and stability of the relationship between spouses. The 
number of children is also affected by economic aspects, such as easy availability of child 
care services, availability of part-time jobs, flexibility of the labour market~ and family 
policies that provide financial support to households with dependent children. Therefore, 
to understand fertility outcomes of families one should potentially control for a number of 
socioeconomic aspects. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to describe family fertility outcomes as a discrete choice 
within a dynamic model. At the start of each period of the reproductive life, the fertility 
choice is the outcome of comparisons between parents' welfare level with and without 
an extra child. Our dynamic model of discrete fertility choice emphasizes the effects 
exert on the family size decision by the costs of rearing children. The dynamic model is 
developed under a set of simplifying assumptions designed to obtain an analytical solution 
to the dynamic program. We assume that the instantaneous utility function of couples 
is of the CARA form and, neglecting that spouses can have different fertility preferences, 
we abstract from bargaining processes that can occur within the couple. Furthermore, 
we assume that parents face perfectly foreseen costs of rearing children and these costs 
are equal across children. Within this framework, we show that in each period of the 
reproductive life the couple does not have a child if the pure utility gain from not having 
a child is greater than the utility obtained from saving in costs from having the child. The 
model has neither direct implications for quality of children nor for the wife's participation 
to the labour force. 
We perform a simulation exercise of the fertility choice model. In particular, we de-
scribe the fertility outcome of traditional and non-traditional couples. The former is a 
family in which there is one main wage earner. On the other hand, the non-traditional 
family is characterized by the presence of two wage earners. We find that the traditional 
couple decides to have two children with a two year gap between the first and second birth. 
On the other hand, since both spouses work, the non-traditional couple faces higher op-
portunity costs and, in turn, higher costs of rearing children relative to the traditional 
couple. Thus the non-traditional couple has just one child. The consumption pattern and 
assets accumulation of the two families are influenced by their fertility outcomes. Given 
a bigger family size, during the reproductive life consumption of the traditional family is 
in general higher relative to consumption of the non-traditional family. In addition, both 
families registers a negative assets accumulation. The traditional family, however, gets 
heavier into debts than the non-traditional family. 
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Appendix: Derivation of the Optimal Consumption 
Derivation of the optimal rule for consumption in t 
The optimal household program is 
max 1 -TJt exp ( -f3ct) + p {,\t+l- Nt+l exp [-f38t+l ((1 + r) At+ Yt- Ct- Pnt)]}. 
Ct,,6.tn 
taking the first-order condition 
1Jt exp ( -f3ct) (3- p {Nt+l exp [-f38t+l ((1 + r) At+ Yt- Ct- Pnt)] f38t+d = 0, 
solving for exp ( -f3ct) 
Nt+l 
p8t+l-- exp { -f38t+l [(1 + r) At+ Yt- Pnt]}, 
1Jt 
Nt+l p8t+l-- exp { -f38t+l [(1 + r) At+ Yt- Pnt]}, 
1Jt 
Nt+l p8t+l-- exp {-f38t+l [(1 + r) At+ Yt- Pnt]}, 
1Jt 
exp ( -f3ct) exp (1 + 8t+l) 
and the optimal consumption policy results equal to 
1 
( 
Nt+l) l+at+l { 8t+l } 
exp ( -f3ct) = p8t+l ~ exp -(3 1 + b"t+l [(1 + r) At+ Yt- Pnt] . (A.1) 
Derivation of the value function in t 
1 -TJt exp ( -f3ct) + p {At+l - Nt+l 
exp [-f38t+l ((1 + r) At+ Yt- Ct- Pnt)]}, 
1 -TJt exp ( -(3cp) + p {At+l- Nt+l (A.2) 
exp [-f38t+l ((1 + r) At+ Yt- Ct- Pnt)] exp (f38t+lct)}, 
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where using equation ( A.1) opportunely rearranged, we can derive the expression for 
Substituting the last equation into (4.19) we have 
1 
( 
Nt+1) l+at+l 
1- TJ p8t+1--
t TJt 
(A.3) 
( 
~+1 ) exp -(3
1 
+ 
8
t+
1 
((1 + r) At+ Yt- Pnt) + pA.t+1-
~ 
( 
Nt+1) -l+at+l 
pNt+1 p8t+1 ---;ry;-
exp ( -f38t+1 ((1 + r) At+ Yt- Pnt)) 
( 
8~1 ) exp f3
1 
+ 
8
t+
1 
( (1 + r) At+ Yt - Pnt) , 
8t+l 
lHt+l can be written as 
8t+l _1_ 
TJ 8t+1 ( Nt+1) lHt+l TJt ( $; Nt+1) l+at+l 
_t_PNt+1-- p8t+1-- = -8- put+1--
8t+ 1 TJt TJt t+ 1 TJt 
and 
( 
ot+1 ) exp -(3 1 + 0t+1 ((1 + r) At+ Yt- Pnt) . 
Derivation of the optimal rule for consumption in T - 1 
In T- 1, the optimal household consumption is equal to 
the value function is 
with 
AT-1 - Nr-1 exp ( -f30r-1AT-1) 
AT-1 1 +PAT = 1 + p, 
OT-1 
Nr-1 
or(1+r) (1+r)2 
1 +Or - 2 + r ' 
1JF (1 +Or) (POT) 1+18T [ (3 Or ( Pn )]71.r1+1oT _ - exp -
1 
~ YT-1 - F 1 "T -
or 1JF + ur 
1JF (1 +Or) (POT) 1_:oT exp [-(3 Or (YT-1- Pnp )] 
or 1JF 1 +or 
1 
(1Jp exp ( -(3 (YT-1- Pnp ))) 1HT , 
where Or = 1 + r. 
Derivation of the optimal rule for consumption in T - 2 
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In T- 2, the optimal consumption of spouses evolves as 
exp ( -,Bcr-2) 
the value function is 
AT-2- Nr-2 exp (-,B8r-2Ar-2) 
1 
1 + p>..r-l _ TfF (1 + 8r-l) (p8r-lNT-l) 1+ 8T-1 
8r-l TfF 
with 
AT-2 
8r-2 
Nr-2 
exp [ -/\ !T;;_1 (YT-2- Pnp)l 
exp [ -13 1 !T;;_1 (1+ r) Ar-2] , 
1 + PAT-l = 1 + p (1 + p)' 
8r-l (1 + r) (1 + r) 3 
1 + 8r-l 3+r ' 
TfF (1 + 8r-l) (p8r-l) 1+ 8T-1 [-,B 8r-l ( _ p )]7\r1+o~_ 1 _ ~ exp ~ YT-2 np 1vT-l -UT-l Tjp 1 + UT-l 
1 
TJF (1 + 8r-l) (TJF (1 + 8r)) 1+18 T (p8r_1 ) 1+0~-1 (p8r) ( 1+1oT) 2 
8r-l 8r TJF TfF 
exp [ -13 1 !To~_1 (YT-2- Pnp)] exp [ -13 1 !"or (YT-1- Pnp)ll+~T 
(TJp exp ( -,B (YT-l - Pnp))) ( 1+18T r ' 
. _ (l+r)2 
w1th 8r-l - 2+r 
Chapter 5 
Conclusions 
The thesis examines three central aspects of family behaviour with potentially relevant 
policy implications. In particular, the thesis deals with the labour participation decisions 
of family members, household production undertaken by family members and fertility 
choices of parents. The first two topics are modelled within a static framework using the 
unitary and collective approaches to family behaviour. On the other hand, the model 
of family fertility choices is developed within a dynamic framework in the context of the 
unitary model. In doing so, we assume that parents have equal preferences toward children. 
Although economists have widely recognized the important role played by individual-
ism in modeling family behaviour, there is still no agreement on which approach better 
represents family behaviour. It is likely that family decisions, such as labour participa-
tion, involve a bargaining process between the spouses. On the other hand, it may be 
the case that decisions taken on a daily basis, such as food consumption, do not require a 
bargaining approach to model household behaviour. 
The labour participation analysis presented in the thesis is thus studied employing 
both the unitary and the collective models. In doing so, the properties that characterize 
the two family models can be tested and, in principle, it can be suggested which household 
model fairly represents the labour participation decisions of family members. 
The chapter opens with the analysis of labour participation decisions of married couples 
within the unitary model. Household preferences are assumed to be additively separable 
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in the individual utility function of the spouses and the budget constraint is assumed to be 
linear. Within this framework, the reservation wage theory leads to a complete character-
ization of the labour participation decision. For each spouse a set of reservation wages in 
different labour participation regimes is derived. The set of reservation wages allows char-
acterisation of the participation frontier. As a result, the participation frontier divides the 
market wage plane in four regions. Each region is characterized by an opportunity set such 
that the spouses are jointly better off either of them working, neither of them working, or 
one working and the other not. 
We then analyse the labour participation decisions within the collective model. In 
line with previous works (Blundell et al. 2007, Donni 2003), the standard assumptions 
underlying the collective model, that is Pareto-efficiency, egoistic individual preferences 
and private consumption, are not sufficient to provide a unique derivation of the reservation 
wage function and, in turn, the existence of the participation frontier. 
To overcome the latter shortcoming, Blundell et al. (2007) and Donni (2003) postulate 
that the reservation wage is a contraction with respect to market wages. The reservation 
wage function thus has a unique fixed point with respect to individual market wages and 
when both spouses do not work, there will exist one and only one pair of wages such that 
both spouses are indifferent between working and not working. On the other hand, when 
member i does not work, there will exist a reservation wage function of Wj and y such 
that member i participates in the labour market if and only if her market wage is greater 
than her reservation wage. Consequently, the participation set is partitioned into four 
connected sets with a unique intersection . 
Conversely, we take a different approach. We assume that the Pareto weight Ji is a 
continuous function of individual expected wages rather than current market wages. The 
individual expected wage is defined as the prediction of the wage that an agent would 
get if she were to enter the labour force. It can depend on past working experience and 
demographic characteristics of the agent as well on macro-economic indicators. As a 
result, the reservation wage theory can be applied to described the labour participation 
of spouses also in the context of the collective model. As described in the first chapter. 
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under the assumption that the Pareto weight is function of expected wages rather than 
current market wages, completeness of the reservation wage theory is re-established. This 
entails that the characterization of the participation frontier is similar to that obtained 
within the unitary model of family labour participation. 
The labour participation analysis presented in the thesis can be extended to study 
child labour participation in developing countries. In particular, it is relevant to study the 
relationships, if any exists, between the rule governing resources allocation among adults 
and children and child labour participation. Moreover, it is interesting to compare how 
resources are shared between adults and children across households where children do not 
work and where children work. The comparison could be extended to the case where 
working children maintain ownership of their resources and where they do not. Using a 
collective approach we can study who gains in the family from child labour. Altruistic 
working children may also improve family equality, such as the state of being well-nourished 
and in good health and opportunities to access education, across household members. 
Finally, estimation of the sharing rule within this context can be used to determine the 
best policies in terms of the highest improvement in well-being of the household social 
welfare function and in terms of measures of polarization of the incomes of the household 
and equality of opportunities across members. 
The thesis then considers the family as an "enterprise" producing goods by transform-
ing factor inputs. The factor inputs are time devoted by each spouse to the household 
production. Moreover, consumption decisions of household members are taken in consid-
eration. Thus, the family model describes the family as jointly involved in production and 
in consumption decisions. The family model can embrace both urban and rural families 
in relation to the location of both the household and the entrepreneurial activity. When 
business activity owned by the family is not undertaken, then the household sells labour 
either to the job market or to the household. In this case, the general model of a "family-
firm" reduces to a "family" engaged in domestic production. The "family-firm" model is a 
general equilibrium model in miniature where the household enterprise fully reproduces at 
the micro level the characteristics of a macro society. The production-consumption house-
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hold model is also general in the sense that the household is represented as a collection of 
individuals (Apps and Rees 1988, 1997, and Chiappori 1988, 1992, 1997). 
We study the production-consumption household model under the assumptions of com-
plete and absent markets of the domestic good. This analysis, however, can be extended 
to absence of other markets, for instance absence of labour markets. We focus on the sepa-
ration property between production and consumption choices and emphasize the relevance 
of production and consumption household behaviour both for developing countries, where 
most households are engaged in agricultural activities, and for developed countries, where 
families can run business or agricultural activities and/ or household members devote a 
part of their own time to domestic activities. In addition, it is important to account for 
production-consumption household behaviour when analysing policy intervention in the 
rural economy. Agricultural policies will affect not only production but also consumption 
and labour supply of the family members. 
Under the assumption of marketable domestic goods, the separation property holds and 
the production-consumption household model within a collective context can be solved re-
cursively in two stages. In the first stage, the family is engaged in maximizing a profit 
function independently of its consumption and leisure decisions. Once this choice is made, 
the family decides the optimal consumption-leisure bundle. The consumption-leisure vari-
ables are affected by the production decision through the maximized profits that enter the 
budget constraint. 
We then relax the assumption of complete markets. As a consequence, the implicit price 
of the domestic good is endogenous to each family. We thus study which restrictions should 
be assumed to preserve the separability between production and consumption decisions. 
Specifically, we show that with missing markets a sufficient condition for the separability to 
hold is the assumption of constant returns to scale of the household production technology. 
With constant returns to scale, the minimum cost function depends linearly on output 
and, consequently, the implicit price of the domestic good, defined by the marginal cost 
functions of the domestic good, does not depend on household tastes and the decision 
process. This assures that the production-consumption household model can be solved 
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recursively. Different from the complete market case, when making production choices the 
family behaves as it were a cost minimizer. 
Lastly, we examine the case of missing markets of the domestic good under the as-
sumption of nonconstant returns to scale. Within this setting and joint production, the 
minimum cost function depends nonlinearly on output and, as a result, the implicit price 
of the domestic good is a function of household tastes and the decision process. As a con-
sequence, the production-consumption household model must be solved jointly. f...Ioreover, 
due to joint technologies a closed-form solution to the production-consumption household 
model cannot be found. In order to overcome this drawback, we propose two alternative 
specifications of the production function. 
An alternative assumes that the household has two distinct technologies to produce 
the domestic good consumed privately by the two household members. Without joint 
technologies the household program has a unique closed-form solution. However, the pro-
duction and consumption decisions must be solved jointly and due to the specification of 
the production functions the sharing rule model cannot be employed. A second specifica-
tion of the production function that we propose is a viable way to apply the sharing rule 
model. We assume that each household member produces by herself the domestic product 
that she privately consumes. However, the production-consumption decisions are taken 
jointly by each household member. 
In the thesis we also extend the generalized collective Slutsky equation to incorporate 
the production choices of the family both with marketable and nonmarketable domestic 
goods. Either with complete markets of the domestic good or missing markets and constant 
returns to scale production functions, the introduction of household production does not 
make much difference in terms of comparative static analysis. The collective Slutsky 
conditions satisfy the SNR1 property (Browning and Chiappori 1998). This property 
states that the collective Slutsky matrix is made of a symmetric, negative semidefinite 
matrix and a rank one matrix. The rank one matrix originates from the shift of the 
Pareto weight due to changes of prices and nonlabour income. On the other hand, with 
absence of markets for the domestic good and production functions with nonconstant 
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returns to scale the comparative static analysis fails to predict unambiguously the sign 
and symmetry of the Slutsky matrix. 
The last purpose of the thesis is to describe the family fertility decisions. Fertility 
choices of the parents are treated as discrete choices. In particular, at the start of each 
period of the reproductive life, the fertility choice is the outcome of comparisons between 
parents' welfare level with and without an extra child. The dynamic model is developed 
under a set of simplifying assumptions designed to obtain an analytical solution to the 
dynamic program. We assume that the instantaneous utility function of couples is of 
the CARA form and, neglecting that spouses can have different fertility preferences, we 
abstract from bargaining processes that can occur within the couple. Furthermore, we 
assume that parents face perfectly foreseen costs of rearing children and these costs are 
equal across children. Within this framework, we show that in each period of the repro-
ductive life the couple does not have a child if the pure utility gain from not having a child 
is greater than the utility obtained from saving in costs from having the child. 
The chapter performs a simulation exercise of the fertility choice model. Predictions 
of the simulation are consistent with demographic trends of countries, such as Italy, in 
which family policies do not provide sufficient and targeted financial support to families 
with dependent children. As a consequence of inadequate family policies, the total fertility 
rate is lower relatively to countries with generous family policies (Apps and Rees 2004). 
In particular, we describe the fertility outcome of traditional and non-traditional cou-
ples. The former is a families in which there is one main wage earner. On the other hand, 
the non-traditional family is characterized by the presence of two wage earners. We find 
that the traditional couple decides to have two children with a two year gap between the 
first and second birth. On the other hand, since both spouses work, the non-traditional 
couple faces higher opportunity costs and, in turn, higher costs of rearing children relative 
to the traditional couple. Thus the non-traditional couple has just one child. 
The consumption pattern and assets accumulation of the two families are influenced 
by their fertility decisions. Given a bigger family size, during the reproductive life con-
sumption of the traditional family is in general higher relative to consumption of the 
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non-traditional family. In addition, both families dissave. The traditional family, how-
ever, gets heavier into debt than the non-traditional family. 
The fertility dynamic model emphasizes the effects exerted on the family size decision 
by the costs of rearing children. Hence, the chapter briefly addresses the issue of how 
to measure the costs of rearing children. It is argued that the costs of rearing children 
corresponds to the amount of income spent or foregone to have and raise children. These 
costs, as with those associated with other goods, depend both on the quantity, that is 
the number of children, and the quality, in the sense of quality of life that parents can 
guarantee to their children by investing time and other material resources in acquiring 
both consumption goods and investment goods such as education, medical care, and oth-
ers. The costs of rearing a child are a fundamental part of the information affecting the 
endogenous choice of having a child. Besides, these costs are not maintained constant for 
different families because there are differences in quality. For instance, the child of a rich 
family can complement the education received in public school with the private supply of 
education. The costs of rearing children reproduces the information known to families at 
the moment they decide to have a new child. For this reason, to design adequate family 
policies policy-makers should have in mind these costs. Indeed, one of the major questions 
regarding social policies is concerned with determining the amount of transfers from the 
state to families necessary to satisfy the society's objectives given the government budget 
constraint. Moreover, the efficacy of family policies is critically affected by intra-household 
resource allocation rules. 
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